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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT COMPARABILITY 
by 
Mohammad Nazrul Islam 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Clark Wheatley, Major Professor 
Comparability is a central feature of financial reporting systems. Comparability is 
defined by FASB (2010, 19) as “the qualitative characteristic that enables users to identify 
and understand similarities in, and differences among, items.” The Accounting Principles 
Board ranked comparability as one of the most important objectives of financial reporting 
and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles have underscored the importance of 
comparability for the past four decades. Using empirical measures of financial statement 
comparability, studies confirm that comparability plays an important role in analyst 
following, audit fees, credit risk, acquisition decisions, stock price volatility, the cost of 
debt, the cost of equity, and cash holdings. This dissertation, investigates the impact of 
comparability on trade credit, earnings management through classification shifting, and on 
non-Big4 auditors.  Prior studies find that comparable firms enjoy a lower cost of equity 
capital and a lower cost of debt. They should, therefore, require less trade credit. I also find 
that comparable smaller and/or financially distressed firms require less trade credit whereas 
they normally require higher levels of trade credit. The results presented in my first essay 
support this hypothesis in that comparability and trade credit are significantly negatively 
associated. The results presented in my second essay show that managers’ earnings 
vi 
 
management through classification shifting is significantly influenced by the degree of 
financial statement comparability with other firms. I also find that comparable firms engage 
in less classification shifting and that the impact of comparability is more pronounced after 
the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  The results presented in my third essay show that 
companies audited by non-Big4 auditors are less comparable than the companies audited 
by Big4 auditors. Non-Big4 auditors are thus less likely to be able to apply the same audit 
process to multiple clients. I find that this results in greater audit effort, as proxied by higher 
audit fees, for Non-Big4 firms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Until we can measure the amount of comparability obtained for a given level of detailed 
guidance, we will not be well armed with evidence on which to base discussions about 
the desirability of limiting the amount of detail provided in standards, when the intent of 
that detail is increased comparability.”  
                                                                                              ---Katherine Schipper (2003) 
 
 Comparability, unlike other qualitative characteristics, is one of the enhancing 
qualitative characteristics that augment the usefulness of information (FASB 2010). 
Comparability is the quality of information that enables users to identify and understand 
similarities and differences between items. Even though Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concept No. 2 (FASB 1980) considered comparability as second to relevance 
and faithful representation, the Framework (1989) stated that comparability is as important 
as relevance and faithful representation.  SFAC No. 8 states that “Investing and lending 
decisions essentially involve evaluations of alternative opportunities, and they cannot be 
made rationally if comparative information is not available.” (FASB 2010, p. 26). Despite 
the importance of accounting comparability, there is still little empirical evidence on the 
benefits of financial statement comparability. Recent empirical measures of comparability 
(e.g., De Franco et al. 2011) have, however, helped scholars to investigate the role of 
comparability on analyst forecasts, analyst following, analyst coverage, mergers, 
acquisitions, audit fees, stock price crash risk, cost of equity capital, cost of debt, accruals, 
and real earnings management. No study has, however, yet examined whether financial 
statement comparability plays a role in trade credit decisions, classification shifting of 
operating expenses, and the behavior of non-Big4 and Big4 auditors in auditing comparable 
clients.  
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This dissertation examines the role of financial statement comparability in three 
important areas. In the first essay, I examine whether managers of comparable firms require 
less trade credit. Studies (Imhof et al. 2017; Fang et al. 2016) find that comparable firms 
enjoy a lower cost of capital and a lower cost of debt. This suggests that they can easily 
meet their financing needs by generating money from capital markets or financial 
institutions. Finance studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1997; Molina and Preve 2012) 
document that firms facing financial difficulties require more trade credit because they are 
rejected by traditional financial institutions. Schwarts (1974) predicts that suppliers extend 
credit to firms who are credit rationed. Prior research (e.g., Kim et al. 2013; Fang et al. 
2016) find that firms with better accounting comparability attract a greater number of 
lenders and have less credit risk, suggesting that comparable firms are less likely to be 
credit rationed. These theories suggest that firms with higher accounting comparability 
should require less trade credit.  To test this prediction, I employ a sample of US listed 
firms over the 1987-2015 period. I find a negative relation between financial statement 
comparability and trade credit. The documented association is robust to alternative research 
designs and measures of comparability as well as trade credit, and holds after controlling 
for endogeneity issues. A change regression also confirms these results. To substantiate the 
impact of financial statement comparability on trade credit, I conduct cross-sectional tests 
and find that comparable smaller firms and comparable firms in financial distress, which 
generally use more trade credit due to their external financing constraints, require less trade 
credit than their less comparable peers.  
The second essay examines whether firms with higher accounting comparability 
are less likely to be engaged in earnings management through classification shifting. 
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Scholars in accounting have extensively investigated earnings management through 
manipulation of accruals and real activities management. The literature also expresses 
concern that managers use alternative forms of earnings management when one of them is 
constrained. A third category of earnings management, classification shifting, can also be 
employed (McVay 2006), and concerns about this tactic have been voiced by regulators 
such as SEC. Prior studies document that accounting comparability works as a monitor, 
and the extant literature documents significant relationships between financial statement 
comparability and a number of characteristics/activities. De Franco et al. (2011) find that 
analyst following is associated with comparability. Zhang (2012) finds an association with 
audit fees. Other research links comparability to: IFRS adoption (Brochet et al. 2013), 
Credit risk (Kim et al. 2013), valuation of seasoned equity offerings (Shane et al. 2014), 
stock-price crash risk (Kim et al. 2016), and the efficiency of acquisition decisions (Chen 
et al. 2016). Still other research has linked comparability to debt contracting (Fang et al. 
2016), accrual based and real earnings management (Sohn 2016), the informativeness of 
stock prices about future earnings (Choi et al. 2017), and the cost of equity capital (Imhof 
et al. 2017). While Sohn (2016) addresses the impact of comparability on accruals and real 
activities management, he does not test whether comparability also plays a role in 
classification shifting. From the above discussion, I hypothesize that firms with better 
financial statement comparability are less likely to be engaged in classification shifting. 
Studies (e.g., McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010) posit that a positive relation between 
unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items is an indicator of likely 
classification shifting. I classify a firm as a shifter if its unexpected core earnings are 
positive (actual core earnings less expected core earnings) and the change in special items 
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(special items in year t less special items in year t-1) is positive for fiscal year t. In 
additional analysis, I follow Fan and Liu (2017), and employ alternative measures of 
classification shifting: cost of goods sold classification shifting, and operating expense 
classification shifting. I adopt De Franco et al.’s (2011) proxy for financial statement 
comparability that is built on the idea that the output of comparable financial reporting 
systems (e.g., earnings) should be similar for firms with similar economic events. Using a 
sample of 34,686 firm-year observations, I find (consistent with Abernathy et al. 2014) that 
18% of firms engage in classification shifting. I also find that financial statement 
comparability is significantly negatively associated with shifters. I find that 36% of the 
firms engage in cost of goods sold classification shifting (CS_COGS) and 14% of the firms 
engage in general and administrative expense classification shifting (CS_XSGA). I also find 
that financial statement comparability is significantly negatively associated with 
CS_COGS and CS_XSGA. To establish a link between financial statement comparability 
and classification shifting, I test whether governance is associated with comparability. I 
find that governance is significantly, positively associated with comparability.  
My third essay examines whether Big4 and non-Big4 auditors respond to the 
comparability of client firms in similar way. Studies (e.g., Zhang 2018) on comparability 
find that firms with better financial statement comparability pay lower audit fees. Closely 
related literature (e.g., Cairney and Young 2006; Bills et al. 2015) find that auditors are 
more likely to be specialized in homogenous industries and they charge incrementally 
lower audit fees for homogenous clients. My results indicate that the findings of these 
studies are likely driven by the influence of Big4 auditors, as the Big4 audit approximately 
80 percent of listed firms (Zeff and Fossum 1967; Hogan and Jeter 1999). It is therefore 
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worth investigating whether Big4 and non-Big4 auditors follow similar patterns when 
auditing comparable firms. I.e., are the client firms equally comparable between the Big4 
and non-Big4, and do Big4 and non-Big4 auditors charge the same audit fees for 
comparable firms? Studies, such as Simunic (1980), find that big audit firms charge lower 
audit fees because they have economies of scale. Smaller auditor firms that lack this scale 
charge higher audit fees. Since Big4 auditors audit the majority of listed companies, their 
client base should comprise a greater number of comparable firms. They will, therefore, be 
able to charge lower audit fees because they can transfer the knowledge learned and audit 
processes designed, to many, similar clients. In contrast, non-Big4 auditors are likely to 
have fewer comparable clients, and will thus be less likely to achieve economies of scale. 
As a result, they are more likely to charge higher audit fees. Following this intuition, I 
hypothesize that firms audited by non-Big4 auditors are less comparable than firms audited 
by the Big4, and that non-Big4 auditors charge higher audit fees for auditing comparable 
firms. Using U.S. firm data for the years 2000 to 2015, I find that firms audited by Big4 
auditors are more comparable than firms audited by non-Big4 auditors. I also find that Big4 
auditors charge incrementally lower audit fees for auditing comparable firms, and non-
Big4 auditors charge incrementally higher audit fees for auditing comparable firms. These 
findings are robust to alternative measures of comparability and hold after controlling for 
endogeneity. The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter II 
discusses the role of financial statement comparability on trade credit. Chapter III narrates 
whether comparable firms are less likely to be engaged in earnings management through 
classification shifting. Finally, Chapter IV investigates whether Big4 and non-Big4 
auditors follow the similar patterns in auditing comparable firms. 
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II. ESSAY 1: FIRM COMPARABILITY AND TRADE CREDIT 
II. 1. Motivation 
Comparability is one of the four enhancing qualitative characteristics of accounting 
information.1 As a central feature of the financial reporting system, comparability is 
defined by the FASB (2010, p. 19) as “the qualitative characteristic that enables users to 
identify and understand similarities in, and differences among, items.” One of the main 
purposes of financial reporting standards is to increase the comparability of reported 
financial information. Using empirical measures of financial statement comparability, prior 
studies have confirmed that comparability plays an important role in analyst following (De 
Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011; De Franco, Hope, and Larocque 2015), audit fee (Zhang 
2012), credit risk (Kim, Kraft, and Ryan 2013), acquisition decisions (Chen, Collins, 
Kravet, and Mergenthaler 2018), stock price volatility (Kim, Li, Lu, and Yu 2016), the cost 
of debt (Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang 2016), the cost of equity capital (Imhof, Seavey, and 
Smith 2017), and the informativeness of stock prices (Choi, Choi, Myers, and Ziebart 
2017). The role of accounting comparability in one of the most important financing 
decisions firms face - trade credit - is, however, heretofore unexplored.  
Trade credit is recorded as accounts payable on a borrowing firm’s balance sheet 
and as accounts receivable on a lending firm’s balance sheet. Trade credit is the single most 
important source of short-term external financing for most firms (Petersen and Rajan 
1997). It is used by more than 80 percent of all firms and constitutes more than 20 percent 
of all firm liabilities (Jain 2001). Despite the magnitude of these items, trade credit has 
                                                          
1 FASB (2010, 19) in its Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 mentions four enhancing 
qualitative characteristics--Comparability, Verifiability, Timeliness, and Understandability.   
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been largely ignored by accounting research. I address a portion of this research gap by 
enriching the understanding of the role of financial statement comparability in firms’ trade 
credit decisions. Specifically, I examine the relation between financial statement 
comparability and firms’ reliance on trade credit. My results indicate that financial 
statement comparability is inversely related to trade credit. This result is important because 
it sheds light on the relation between accounting comparability and short-term financing 
decisions, which is one of the prime objectives of standard setters.2  
Existing studies in finance3 and accounting4 suggest several reasons why financial 
statement comparability and trade credit may be related. First, since comparable firms 
enjoy a lower cost of capital (Imhof et al. 2017, Fang et al. 2016), they can easily meet 
their financing needs through the credit and equity markets. Alternatively, Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) and Molina and Preve (2012) conclude that firms facing financial difficulties 
require more trade credit because they are rejected by traditional financers. In his economic 
model, Schwartz (1974) predicts that suppliers extend credit to firms who are credit 
                                                          
2 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 8 states that “Investing and lending decisions 
essentially involve evaluations of alternative opportunities, and they cannot be made rationally if comparative 
information is not available.” (FASB 2010, p. 26). 
 
3 In his economic model of trade credit, Schwartz (1974) predicts that larger, more financially secure 
producers offer trade credit to firms who are “rationed” from the direct credit market. To protect their 
investments, Smith (1987) argues, suppliers extend trade credit to firms not able to secure alternative low-
cost financing. Empirically, Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that because of their comparative advantage in 
acquiring information about buyers, suppliers lend to constrained firms whose access to capital markets is 
limited. When banks’ monitoring costs are higher, they prefer to lend credit through a channel of suppliers 
(Jain 2001) because suppliers have the added advantage of having private information. Trade credit is a way 
for buyers to circumvent the noncompetitive rents of financial institutions (Emery 1984).  
 
4 De Franco et al. (2011) empirically find that financial statement comparability is positively associated with 
the number of analyst following and it lowers the cost of acquiring information. Kim, Li, Lu, and Yu (2016) 
argue that comparable firms’ information asymmetry is lower. Comparable firms enjoy lower cost of debt 
(Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang 2016) and lower cost of capital.  
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rationed from direct credit markets. Studies in accounting5 find that firms with greater 
financial statement comparability attract a greater number of lenders, a greater number of 
uninformed participating lenders, and exhibit lower credit risk. This suggests that 
comparable firms are less likely to be credit rationed, and it follows that financial statement 
comparability and trade credit should be negatively associated. 
Second, prior research (e.g., Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Healy and Palepu 2001) 
finds that information asymmetry is negatively associated with the cost of capital. 
Consistent with this, Cheng and Pike (2003) note that both buyers and sellers are more 
likely to be attracted to trade credit when there is high information asymmetry between 
them. Comparable firms should, however, exhibit lower information asymmetry (Kim et 
al. 2016) as peer monitoring prevents managers from hiding information. Because financial 
statement comparability works as a monitoring device, and financial institutions can invest 
less time and lower the cost of monitoring comparable firms, financial institutions would, 
ceteris paribus, be more likely to extend credit to comparable firms. This would reduce the 
dependence of comparable firms on trade credit.  
Third, greater comparability facilitates information transfer among the comparable 
firms (De Franco et al. 2011), lowers information acquisition costs, increases the quality 
and quantity of information to the outsiders, and decreases the uncertainties related to 
performance evaluation. Together these works to reduce the external financing constraints 
on firms, which again should reduce their reliance on trade credit.  
                                                          
5 See for more Kim, Kraft, and Ryan (2013) and Fang et al. (2016).  
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Fourth, suppliers do not perform in depth analyses of the financial statements of 
buyers when they extend trade credit (Smith 1987). This suggests comparability is of no 
concern to suppliers, and that a lack of comparability will cause firms to seek out trade 
credit. Based on the above I predict that firms with greater (lesser) financial statement 
comparability require less (more) trade credit.  
To test my prediction, I employ a sample of U.S. listed firms over the 1987-2015 
period. I find a negative relation between financial statement comparability and trade 
credit. The documented association is robust to alternative research designs and measures 
of comparability as well as alternative measures of trade credit. The association also holds 
after controlling for endogeneity. Change regression also confirms the documented results. 
To substantiate the impact of financial statement comparability on trade credit, I conduct 
cross-sectional tests and find that while smaller firms and firms in financial distress use 
more trade credit, comparable firms in that group require less trade credit than their less 
comparable peers.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper contributes 
to the literature on corporate financing. Prior studies (e.g., Schwartz 1974; Smith 1987; 
Petersen and Rajan 1997; Jain 2001; Molina and Preve 2012) have investigated the 
determinants of trade credit. No study has yet, however, investigated whether accounting 
comparability might also be a determinant in trade credit decisions.6 I establish that 
accounting comparability is an important determinant in trade credit decisions.  
                                                          
6 Accrual quality is within firm accounting quality whereas comparability is between firm accounting quality. 
Discretionary accruals affect accounting outcomes, whereas the quality of earnings affects accounting 
comparability. Studies on audit fees (Gul, Chen, and Tsui 2003 vs Zhang 2018), cost of debt (Bharat, Sunder, 
and Sunder 2008 vs Fang et al. 2016), cost of capital (Francis, Nanda, and Ohlson 2008 vs Imhof, Seavey, 
and Smith 2017), and acquisition decisions (McNichols and Stubben 2015 vs Chen et al. 2018) suggest that 
10 
 
Studies on trade credit (e.g., Schwartz 1974; Smith 1987; Biais and Gollier1997) 
document that suppliers want to form long-term relationships with buyers who are smaller, 
have been credit rationed, and are not transparent in reporting. This indicates that firms that 
have good relationships with their suppliers and do not have easy access to external 
financing have less motivation to prepare comparable financial statements. I deal with this 
potential endogeneity in several ways— (1) I use the lag of the independent variables 
[reverse causality is mitigated] (2) I employ instrumental variables and two-stage 
regressions, and (3) I employ firm fixed-effects to control for time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics that may be correlated with omitted variables. Next, my study contributes 
to the growing literature investigating the impact of accounting comparability on financial 
markets. The role of accounting comparability has been investigated with respect to the 
impact of accounting comparability on external financial--debt and equity financing (Fang 
et al. 2016; Imhof et al. 2017), but no study has yet examined the role of comparability on 
trade credit, the most commonly used source of short-term financing.7 Third, this study 
also helps regulators in the sense that it confirms the benefits of accounting comparability.8  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design. Section 4 
presents my results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
                                                          
discretionary accruals and accounting comparability are different from each other. Indeed, FASB (1980, 
2010) has termed comparability as an accounting “quality.” Please see Appendix B for more information.  
 
7 Wilner (1996) notes that in the US economy for each $1 in short-term debt, there was $1.94 in trade credit. 
In my sample, trade credit is 8% of total assets whereas the remaining short-term liabilities comprise only 
4% of total assets. Before the financial crisis in 2007-2009, about 90% of the global merchandise trade was 
financed by trade credit (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011).  
 
8 Investing and lending decisions essentially involve evaluations of alternative opportunities, and they cannot 
be made rationally if comparative information is not available (FASB 1980, 26).  
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II. 2. Literature and Hypothesis development 
Financial Statement Comparability 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 states that 
comparability is a qualitative characteristics of accounting information (FASB 1980), and 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 states that comparability is an 
enhancing qualitative characteristic (FASB 2010). FASB defines financial statement 
comparability as the extent to which an information user can recognize the similarities and 
differences in the financial performance of two firms. SFAC No. 8 states that “Investing 
and lending decisions essentially involve evaluations of alternative opportunities, and they 
cannot be made rationally if comparative information is not available.” (FASB 2010, p. 
26). One of the objectives of accounting information is to help investors compare the 
performance of different firms so that they can make informed decisions. The U.S. FASB 
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) developed a common 
conceptual framework, based on and built on both the IASB framework and the FASB 
framework. This framework mentions comparability as an important decision-useful 
qualitative characteristic of financial information (FASB 2010). The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has also emphasized financial statement comparability 
across firms. SEC Chairman, Mary Jo White, in her Public Statement on January 5, 2017, 
stated, for example, that “Building high-quality, globally accepted accounting standards 
requires that the Commission support further efforts by the FASB and IASB on 
convergence between their accounting standards to enhance the quality and comparability 
of financial reporting – both domestically and across borders.” (SEC 2017).  
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Other qualitative characteristics (e.g., value relevance, persistence, predictability), 
have received more attention than comparability in the accounting literature. Holthausen 
and Watts (2001) mention, for example, 62 papers on value relevance that were published 
in top tier journals, yet despite the importance of comparability in the conceptual 
framework of accounting (FASB 1980, 2010), prior literature has paid little attention to 
financial statement comparability. The paucity of research on comparability was likely due 
to lack of a standard comparability measure. Schipper (2003 expresses the concern as 
follows: 
“…until we can measure the amount of comparability obtained for a given 
level of detailed guidance, I will not be well armed with evidence on which 
to base discussions about the desirability of limiting the amount of detail 
provided in standards, when the intent of that detail is increased 
comparability.” (Schipper 2003, p. 68) 
After the development of De Franco et al.’s (2011) measure of financial statement 
comparability, researchers responded to the call of Schipper (2003) for more research on 
accounting comparability. There are two streams to this research. One has investigated the 
impact of events (e.g., IFRS adoption) on accounting comparability. Here, accounting 
numbers are deemed comparable if, when two firms face the same economic outcomes, 
they report similar accounting numbers (Barth et al. 2012). The other stream of research 
has examined the impact of accounting comparability on financial and economic 
phenomena.9  Because comparable firms become better benchmarks for each other, 
                                                          
9 The existing literature, for example, documents a significant relation between financial statement 
comparability and: analyst following (De Franco et al. 2011); audit fees (Zhang 2018); accounting after the 
adoption of IFRS (Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2013); credit risk (Kim et al. 2013); valuation of seasoned 
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information transfer among them becomes easy and users have access to more information 
about firms’ financial performance with less effort (Kim et al. 2013).  
Trade Credit 
There has been a long running debate among researchers on what motivates sellers 
and buyers to extend or receive trade credit. The two most discussed motives are financing 
and transactions. The financing motive (Schwartz 1974) suggests that suppliers have an 
advantage over traditional lenders in their access to information about the creditworthiness 
about their clients, and their ability to monitor and force repayment of credit. Suppliers that 
have easier access to capital markets than their customers can extend more credit to utilize 
their capacity for borrowing. The financing motive argues that in case of imperfections in 
the credit market, rationing of credit to borrowers leads to the use of trade credit.10  
The transactions motive (Ferris 1981) argues that rather than paying suppliers as 
they receive goods, buyers want to cumulate obligations and pay them once a month or 
quarter. This process helps managers to manage cash more efficiently. Sellers also benefit 
because they can predict cash receipts efficiently. While financially solvent firms are likely 
to prefer the transactions approach, for startups and smaller firms the financing motive is 
crucial (they’re more likely to be rationed11 by institutional sources of credit). Based on 
the above discussion, I predict and test the following hypothesis in alternative form:  
                                                          
equity (Shane, Smith, and Zhang 2014); crash risk (Kim et al. 2016); efficiency of acquisition decisions 
(Chen et al. 2018); debt contracting (Fang et al. 2016); accrual based and real earnings management (Sohn 
2016); informativeness of stock price about future earnings (Choi et al. 2017); and the cost of equity capital 
(Imhof et al. 2017). 
 
10 See Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott (1980), Emery (1984), Schwartz (1974), Smith (1987) 
 
11 For example, see Bester (1985), Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Freel (2007). 
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H1a: Financial statement comparability is negatively associated with trade  
        credit.  
While my first hypothesis predicts a negative association of comparability with 
trade credit overall, there are two sub-populations that prior research has shown to place 
greater reliance on trade credit. Those populations are distressed firms and small firms. 
Whether my overall prediction holds for those sub-populations is thus worthy of 
investigation. 
Financial distress 
Because financially distressed firms are more likely to go bankrupt (Tsuruta and 
Xu 2007), their ability to acquire external financing is severely curtailed (Molina and Preve 
2012). Financial distress impairs access to credit from financial institutions and raises the 
cost of capital (Opler and Titman 1994; Wilner 1996; Molina and Preve 2012). As a 
consequence, distressed firms would be more likely to use trade credit as an alternative 
source of financing. Peteren and Rajan (1994, 1995) theorize that when cheaper sources of 
external financing are exhausted, firms turn to trade credit, and Molina and Preve (2012) 
document that financially distressed firms use significantly larger amounts of trade credit. 
From the suppliers’ side, there is evidence that suppliers, in order to maintain long-term 
relationships, grant more concessions to customers in financial distress (Evans 1998). 
Therefore, financially distress firms either take more trade credit or they are provided more 
trade credit. As noted above, however, financial statement comparability plays a role in 
external financing with more comparable firms enjoying a lower cost of capital (e.g., Fang 
et al. 2016; Imholf 2017) and utilizing less trade credit. In this circumstance, comparability 
may enable lenders to better evaluate the extent of a firm’s distress and the resulting 
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likelihood of bankruptcy. Based on this, I hypothesize that comparable firms, even when 
they are financially distressed, will require less trade credit than less comparable distressed 
firms. My second hypothesis, in alternative form, is thus: 
H1b: Financial statement comparability is negatively associated with trade credit 
        for distressed firms. 
Firm size 
Firm size has also been shown to play a role in financing. Smaller firms suffer from 
information opacity because they do not enter into publicly visible contracts with their 
labor force, suppliers, and customers. In most cases, small firms do not issue securities in 
the capital markets, suggesting that there are few or no analysts following those firms. 
Studies (e.g., Frankel and Li 2004; Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkkataraman 2013) 
document that information asymmetry is higher for smaller firms. Due to this information 
opacity, financial institutions are less likely to provide financing to smaller firms and when 
they do, the cost of debt is higher. Archer and Faerber (1966) also find that the overall cost 
of capital is higher for smaller firms. Schwartz’s (1974) economic model of trade credit 
predicts that larger, more financially secure producers offer trade credit to their smaller, 
less financially secure customers. Consistent with my expectations for distress, I expect 
that comparable smaller firms will also require less trade credit than less comparable small 
firms. My third hypothesis is thus: 
H1c: Financial statement comparability is negatively associated with trade credit 
         for small firms. 
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II. 3. Research Design 
Sample  
I start with COMPUSTAT firms for the period 1987 through 2015.12 I then merge 
CRSP with COMPUSTAT and remove utilities (SIC codes: 4000 to 4999) and financial 
services firms (SIC codes: 6000 to 6999). I also remove firm-year observations that have 
missing data on financial statement comparability, trade credit, and missing control 
variables. I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. My final 
sample comprises 38,738 firm-year observations.  
Model specification: 
To test the impact of financial statement comparability on trade credit, I use the 
following multivariate regression: 
TRADECREDITit = β0 + β1FSCOMP4it + ∑ βj
14
j=2
CONTROLSit + Ink+Yrt+εit           (1) 
I also use the following logistic regression.  
PROB_TC(=1)=β
0
+β
1
FSCOMP4it+ ∑ βj
14
j=2
CONTROLSit+Ink+Yrt+εit                           (1.1) 
where TRADECREDITit is accounts payable (AP) scaled by total assets (AT) and 
FSCOMP4it is the firm specific comparability measure based on the mapping of firms’ 
economic events to financial statements from De Franco et al. (2011). 𝐼𝑛𝑘 and 𝑌𝑟𝑡 are 
included in the model to control for industry and year fixed effects respectively. PROB_TC 
in equation (1.1) is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a firm’s trade credit is 
                                                          
12 I use cash from operating activities (OANCF), available from 1987 onward.  
17 
 
greater than its industry mean (based on Fama-French 48 industry) for three consecutive 
years and 0 otherwise. I use different regression settings because my dependent variable, 
trade credit, is left censored. First, I use ordinary least square (OLS) to test the linear 
relationship between financial statement comparability and trade credit. Second, since trade 
credit is left censored, I use a Tobit regression with a lower limit of zero. Third, I use the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. The Fama-MacBeth regression runs the regression 
yearly and reports the average coefficient. I have also controlled for industry fixed effects 
in my Fama-MacBeth regression to minimize the noise of industry differences.  
The key coefficient of interest in regressions (1) and (1.1) is β
1
 for FSCOMP4, 
which depicts the impact of financial statement comparability on trade credit. If financial 
statement comparability helps managers to acquire lower cost external financing (Fang et 
al. 2016; Imhof et al. 2017), trade credit should be lower and β
1
 should be negative. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1997; Jain 2001; Atanasova 2007; Fabbri 
and Klapper 2016; Chen et al. 2018), I include 14 control variables. I control for: firm size 
(log of the book value of total assets); the market to book ratio (MTB); discretionary 
accruals (DAC); investment opportunities (TOBINQ); non-cash current assets relative to 
total assets (CA); cash holdings (CASHHOLD); profitability (ROA); current liabilities 
excluding accounts payable divided by total assets (CL_XTRADE); the debt ratio 
(LEVERAGE); inventory liquidation cost (LIQUIDCOST); firm age (AGE); market share 
(MARKETSHARE); industry competition (COMPETITION); and positive sales 
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(POS_SALE) which is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if sales increased from 
year t-1 to t, and 0 otherwise.13   
Measuring Financial Statement Comparability  
I follow the De Franco et al. (2011) measure of financial statement comparability, 
which is based on the earnings-returns relationship of paired firms. De Franco et al. (2011) 
develop an empirical model based on the assumption that for a given set of economic 
events, two firms produce similar financial results. Following De Franco et al. (2011), I 
first estimate the following:  
Earningsit = αi + βiReturnit + εit                                                 (2) 
where Earnings is the quarterly net income before extraordinary items (IBQ) scaled by 
beginning of the period market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO), and Return is the 
respective quarter’s stock return. I calculate α̂i and β̂i for firm i and in the same way I 
estimate α̂j and  β̂j for firm j. I then use these parameters to estimate expected earnings of 
firm i and j. I use the Return of firm i and the parameters of i and j to compare the Earnings 
of firm i and j as follows: 
E(Earnings)iit = α̂i + β̂iReturnit                                                      (3) 
E(Earnings)ijt = α̂j + β̂jReturnij                                                         (4) 
Keeping the economic event, Returnit, constant, I calculate predicted earnings of 
firm 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 for the period t. Then I compute the accounting comparability between firm 
i and j (FSCOMP4ijt) from the following: 
                                                          
13 I do not include bid-ask spread (a measure of information asymmetry) in my tabulated results as I am 
only able to acquire this metric for 25% of my sample observations. Inclusion of that variable for the 
resulting sub-sample yields, however, results consistent with those presented in the paper. 
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FSCOMPijt=-
1
16
* ∑|E(Earnings
iit
)-E(Earnings
ijt
)|
t
t-15
                                                         (5) 
The smaller the difference between the predicted earnings of i and j, the more 
comparable are the two firms’ accounting systems. I estimate comparability for each 
firm i-firm j combination for J firms within the same two-digit SIC industry classification. 
Then I rank all J values of FSCOMPijt for each firm 𝑖 from the highest to lowest. Next I 
calculate FSCOMP4it as the average of highest four comparability score of 
firm i with firm j. I also compute FSCOMP10, COMP_INMDN, and COMP_INDMEAN. 
The detailed calculations of these measures are defined in Appendix A.  
II. 4. Empirical Results 
Summary statistics and univariate results 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables employed in the 
main regression. TRADE CREDIT has a mean (median) of 0.08 (0.06). Financial statement 
comparability (FSCOMP4) is negative by construction, with a less negative value 
indicating greater comparable. The FSCOMP4 has a mean (median) of -0.53 (-0.29). These 
values are consistent with those of recent studies (e.g., Fang et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2016; 
Imhof et al. 2017). SIZE (log of assets) has a mean (median) of 5.27 (5.11), MTB has a 
mean (median) of 1.95 (1.51), TOBINQ has a mean (median) of 0.47 (0.09). The mean 
(median) firm in my sample has |DAC| of 1.96 (1.53), CA of 0.56 (0.51), CASHHOLD of 
0.21 (0.13), ROA of -0.02 (0.03), and CL_XTRADE of 0.17 (0.14). The mean (median) 
firm AGE is 16.58 (15.00) years, indicating that my sample firms are mature. The mean 
values of LEVERAGE, LIQUIDCOST, MARKETSHARE, COMPETITION, and 
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POS_SALE are 0.21, 0.05, 0.01, 39.59, and 0.52 respectively. These values are also 
consistent with the recent studies (e.g., Wu et al. 2014; Goto et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2017).  
I divide firms into two groups: firms with high financial statement comparability 
and low financial statement comparability, based on the median score of FSCOMP4. Firms 
with a FSCOMP4 score above the median are classified as high comparable firms whereas 
those with FSCOMP4 scores below the median are classified as low comparable firms. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the univariate comparisons of my model variables by high versus 
low financial statement comparability. The mean of TRADE CREDIT in the high 
comparable group is 0.067, while the low comparable group has a mean of. The t-statistic 
for the mean difference is -30.64, suggesting that the difference is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Most of the mean differences between the two groups are statistically 
significant and support my prediction that high comparable firms require less TRADE 
CREDIT.  
The correlation coefficients for variables included in the main analyses are 
presented in Table 2. Across the sample period, FSCOMP4 is significantly (p-value ≤ 
0.000) and negatively (-0.17) correlated with TRADE CREDIT. FSCOMP4 is also 
significantly correlated with other firm specific variables, and these characteristics are also 
significantly correlated with TRADE CREDIT. TRADE CREDIT, for example, is 
significantly negatively correlated with SIZE, MTB, CASHHOLD, and ROA, suggesting 
that firm characteristics should be controlled in my multivariate analysis.  
Multivariate results 
The results of my multivariate regressions are reported in Table 3. Column (1) 
presents the OLS results with both year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are 
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clustered by firm. The coefficient of -0.012 on FSCOMP4 is significant at the 1% level. 
The result is also economically significant as firms require 7.65 percent less trade credit 
with a one standard deviation increase in the financial statement comparability.14 I find that 
firm SIZE, TOBINQ, CASHHOLD, and LEVERAGE are negatively associated with 
TRADE CREDIT, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1997; 
Biais and Gollier 1997). The Variables CA, MARKETSHARE, and POS_SALE are 
positively associated with TRADE CREDIT (also consistent with prior studies e.g., Liu et 
al. 2017).  
Column 2 presents the results of my Tobit model. This model implies nonnegative 
predicted values for TRADE CREDIT, and has sensible partial effects over a wide range 
of control variables. The Tobit model expresses the observed response, TRADE CREDIT, 
in terms of underlying latent variables as: 
TRADE CREDIT∗ = β0 + xβ + ε, u|x~Normal(0, σ
2)                               (6) 
where TRADE CREDIT= max (0, TRADE CREDIT*)                                  (7) 
Equation (7) suggests that TRADE CREDIT will be equal to TRADE CREDIT* 
when TRADE CREDIT* ≥ 0, but TRADE CREDIT will equal 0 when 
TRADE CREDIT*< 0. Since TRADE CREDIT* is normally distributed, TRADE 
CREDIT has a continuous distribution over positive values. The coefficient of FSCOMP4 
is negative (-0.013) and significant at the 1% level. Again, this indicates that firms with 
high financial statement comparability require less trade credit. The signs of all control 
variables are consistent with prior studies.  
                                                          
14 7.65=0.51*0.012/0.08, where the standard deviation of FSCOMP4 is 1.48, 0.012 is the coefficient of 
FSCOMP4, and 0.08 is the mean of TRADE CREDIT. 
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Column (3) of Table 3 presents the results of my Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. 
Assigning equal weight to each firm-year observation, the Fama-MacBeth technique runs 
each regression cross-sectionally for each year and then aggregates the coefficients across 
the years. The results are consistent with my other models in suggesting that financial 
statement comparability is negatively associated with trade credit.  
Finally, I employ a logit model to test the probabilistic relation between financial 
statement comparability and trade credit. The result of this test is presented in column (4) 
of Table 3. PROB_TC is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if firm trade credit is 
greater than the industry-adjusted mean of trade credit within same two-digit SIC industry 
for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise. The results are consistent with my prior models 
and support the hypothesis that comparable firms require less trade credit.  
Quantile regression 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of TRADE CREDIT. (the variable is right skewed). 
The most commonly used regression model for determining the relation between the 
predicted and predictor variables is ordinary least squares (OLS), which assesses how the 
mean value of a predicted variable of a conditional distribution fluctuates with the changes 
in the independent variable(s). OLS may, however, give us an incomplete picture (e.g., 
Mosteller and Tuke 1977; Koenker and Hallock 2001; Koenker 2005) because the mean of 
a distribution may not be the representative of the entire distribution (e.g., Austin and 
Schull 2003). In a skewed distribution, for example, the median of the distribution is 
alternatively used as central tendency (e.g., Wilcox and Keselman 2003; Manikandan 
2011). While OLS can answer whether the independent variable is important or has an 
impact on the dependent variable, to know the complete influence of the predictor 
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variable(s) on the predicted variable, analysis of the tail of a distribution is necessary (e.g., 
Austin and Schull 2003). Quantile regression addresses this by offering a more complete 
picture of a distribution (Koenker 2005), and studies in accounting (e.g., Basu 2005; 
Armstron et al. 2015), finance (e.g., Connolly 1989; Zietz et al. 2008; Meligkotsidou et al. 
2009; Lee and Li 2012), and economics (E.g., Buchinsky 1995; Koenker and Park 1996; 
Koenker and Hallock 2001; Machado and Mata 2005) have used quantile regression to 
overcome the limitations of OLS. Because my predicted variable, trade credit, is right 
skewed, I also use quantile regression to measure the impact of accounting comparability 
on the different quantiles of trade credit. 
The results of these tests are reported in Table 4. From my OLS results, I found that 
a one standard deviation increase in FSCOMP4 was associated with a 7.65 percent decrease 
in TRADE CREDIT. My quantile regression results show, however, that at the 10th quantile 
a one standard deviation increase in FSCOMP4 is associated with only a 1.27 percent 
decrease in TRADE CREDIT. At the 90th quantile TRADE CREDIT decreases 21.03 
percent with a one standard deviation increase in FSCOMP4. These results indicate that 
OLS overestimates the impact of FSCOMP4 at the 10th quantile and underestimates 
FSCOMP4 at the 90th quantile. The tests of differences between the 10th and 90th, 25th and 
90th, 50th and 90th, and 75th and 90th quantile coefficients are also reported in Table 4. These 
results indicate that FSCOMP4 has a heterogenous impact on different levels of TRADE 
CREDIT.  
Endogeneity 
The relation between financial statement comparability and trade credit may be 
biased because of potential endogeneity related to omitted variables and reverse causality.  
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Firms with high comparability, for example, take less trade credit. This suggests that firms 
that take less trade credit are more likely to have high financial statement comparability. 
Since trade credit generates new accounting items (e.g., accounts payable, discounts, and 
accounts receivable) in firm financial statements, firms with less or no trade credit are more 
likely to have less complex and more transparent accounting reports (Chen et al. 2017). In 
other words, since firms (especially small and startup firms) do not employ financing from 
financial institutions and capital markets, instead maintaining good relationship with 
suppliers - they have less motivation to make their financial statements comparable. 
Existing studies (e.g., Smith 1987; Schwartz 1974) find that while providing credit to 
buyers, suppliers do not perform any credit analysis.  It is intuitive, therefore, that trade 
credit may also influence financial statement comparability. To mitigate this potential 
endogeneity concern, I use several methods.  
Endogeneity—Lag of Explanatory Variable 
Following prior studies (Nagar and Rajan 2001; Miguel et al. 2004; MacKay and 
Philips 2005; Collier 2013; Lehoucq and Linan 2014; Sohn 2016), I use the lag value of 
the independent variables to mitigate potential endogeneity between trade credit and 
financial statement comparability. Lagged independent variables also deal with 
simultaneity where the explanatory variable is jointly determined with the dependent 
variable (Clemens et al. 2012). The results of these tests are reported in Table 5, Panel A. 
Column (1) of presents the results of my OLS regression and column (2) reports results of 
my Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression with industry fixed effects. The coefficients on 
FSCOM4 are negative and significant for both the OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions. 
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This supports my main results of a negative association between financial statement 
comparability and trade credit.  
Endogeneity—Omitted variables 
To mitigate the omitted variable bias, I perform a firm-fixed effects regression 
analysis. The inclusion of firm-fixed effects control for unobserved firm characteristics that 
may be correlated with omitted explanatory variables and removes any purely cross-
sectional correlation between financial statement comparability and trade credit. The use 
of a fixed effects approach addresses omitted variables bias arising from unobserved firm 
level time-invariant heterogeneity. The results for these tests are reported in Table 5, Panel 
B. In column (1), the dependent variable is TRADE CREDIT, computed as accounts 
payable (AP) divided by total assets (AT). In column (2), the dependent variable is total 
payables computed as accounts payable (AP) and notes payable (NP) divided by total assets 
(AT). Again, the coefficients on FSCOMP4 are negative  
Endogeneity—Instrumental Variable 
My previous empirical tests are predicted on the assumption that financial statement 
comparability determines whether firms require trade credit. It is also possible that 
financial statement comparability is lower for firms that use more trade credit. I use the 
lead and lag approach to conduct a Granger causality test and find that trade credit may, 
indeed, cause financial statement comparability. To address this concern, I employ a two-
stage regression. In the first stage, I regress FSCOMP4 on all exogenous variables and use 
the fitted value of FSCOMP4 in the second stage. Following prior studies (Sohn 2016; Lee 
et al. 2016), I choose: firm SIZE; the market to book ratio (MTB); profit (PROFIT); 
discretionary actuals (DAC); Z-Score (Z-SCORE); return on assets (ROA); CL_XTRADE; 
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LEVERAGE; the book value of equity (BVE); firm age (AGE); market share 
(MARKETSHARE); TOBINQ; GROWTH; SOX; and regulated industry (REGUL) as my 
exogenous variables. The results of my reported in Table 5, Panel C. Column (1) presents 
the first stage regression. Firm SIZE, AGE, TOBINQ, CRISIS, GROWTH, PROFIT, and 
ZSCORE are positively associated with financial statement comparability. MTB, DAC, 
ROA, LEVERAGE, SOX, REGUL, and MARKETSHARE are negatively associated with 
comparability. The adjusted R2 of the first stage regression is 21.2%, which is consistent 
with prior research.15 I then use the fitted value of FSCOMP4 and repeat the regression 
from Table 3. The results are reported in column (2) of Table 5, Panel C. The coefficient 
on Predicted (FSCOM4) is negative (coeff. = -0.024) and significant at the 1% level. This 
suggests that omitted variables do not affect my main results that financial statement 
comparability is negatively associated with trade credit. In sum, the above results suggest 
that my documented association between financial statement comparability and trade credit 
is not driven by endogeneity. 
Changes Analysis 
To further confirm the association between financial statement comparability and 
trade credit, I conduct change analyses. I investigate whether changes in trade credit are 
explained by changes in financial statement comparability. First, I examine the impact of 
changes in financial statement comparability and control variables on changes in trade 
credit. Second, I create two additional dichotomous variables: IN_TRADECREDIT (an 
increase in trade credit) and DEC_TRADECREDIT (a decrease in trade credit) to test the 
                                                          
15 Sohn’s (2016) analysis has 20.67% of R2.  
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impact of changes in ∆FSCOM4. Consistent with my hypothesis above, I predict a negative 
association between ∆FSCOMP4 and TRADE CREDIT in an overall change regression. I 
also predict that there will be a negative relation between ∆FSCOMP4 and 
IN_TRADECREDIT and a positive association between ∆FSCOM4 and 
DEC_TRADECREDIT. I replace the dependent variable, TRADE CREDIT, in the main 
regression equation by ∆TRADE CREDIT, IN_TRADECREDIT, and 
DEC_TRADECREDIT respectively as follows: 
∆TRADECREDIT=β
0
+β
1
∆FSCOMP4it+ ∑ βj
15
j=2 ∆CONTROLSit+FYi + Indi+εit                       (8)                             
IN_TRADECREDIT=β
0
+β
1
∆FSCOMP4it+ ∑ βj
15
j=2
∆CONTROLSit+FYi+Indi+εit          (9) 
DEC_TRADECREDIT=β
0
+β
1
∆FSCOMP4it+ ∑ βj
15
j=2 ∆CONTROLSit+FYi+Indi+εit    (10)  
where ∆ indicates the change in a variable from year t-1 to t. IN_TRADE CRDIT 
is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the change in trade credit from year t-1 to t is 
positive and 0 otherwise. DEC_TRADE CREDIT is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 if the change in trade credit from year t-1 to t is negative, and 0 otherwise. The results 
are presented in Table 6. In column (1), the OLS regression coefficient on FSCOMP4 is 
negative (coeff. = -0.002) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that changes in trade 
credit are explained by changes in financial statement comparability. In column (2), the 
logit regression coefficient on FSCOMP4 is significantly negative (p ≤ 0.05), suggesting 
that increases in trade credit are negatively associated with changes in financial statement 
comparability. In column (3), the coefficient on FSCOMP4 is positively significant 
(p ≤ 0.05), indicating that decreases in trade credit are positively associated with financial 
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statement comparability. Taken together, the results presented in Tables 3 through 6 
provide considerable support for Hypothesis 1a that, overall, financial statement 
comparability is negatively associated with the use of trade credit. 
Financial distress 
Because financially distressed firms are more likely to use trade credit per se, I 
investigate whether my overall results hold for a subsample of distressed firms. I test 
Hypothesis 1b by employing the interest coverage ratio as my measure of distress. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Asquith et al. 1994; Arnold et al. 2014; Corbae and D’Erasmo 
2017) I create an indicator variable DISTRESS that is equal to 1 if the interest coverage 
ratio (earnings before interest divided by interest and related expense), is below 0.80 in any 
fiscal year and 0 otherwise. The results of my tests are presented in column (1) of Table 7. 
The coefficient on FSCOMP4×DISTRESS is negative and significant at the 1% level, and 
the coefficient on DISTRESS is insignificant. The test for difference between the 
coefficients of FSCOMP4×DISTRESS and DISTRESS is highly significant and indicates 
that comparable financially distressed firms take less trade credit than less comparable 
firms.  
Firm size 
Like distressed firms, smaller firms have also been shown to utilize more trade 
credit overall. To test whether comparability has any impact on this, I divide my sample 
into two groups: small and large, separated at the median. SIZE_SMALL is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a firm’s size is less than the median of size, and 0 otherwise. The 
results of my tests are presented in column (2) of Table 7. The coefficient on 
FSCOMP4×SIZE_SMALL is significantly negative, (p ≤ 0.01) and the test for difference 
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between the coefficients of FSCOMP4×SIZE_SMALL and SIZE_SMALL is also 
significant (p ≤ 0.01),  
Robustness checks 
My results may be driven by the firm specific measure of financial statement 
comparability, biased due to the measure of trade credit, or driven by omitted variables. To 
address these potential concerns, I use: three alternative measures of financial statement 
comparability; three alternative measures of trade credit; and add additional control 
variables. 
Alternative measures of financial statement comparability 
My main regression analysis is based on the most commonly used financial 
statement comparability measure (FSCOMP4). To control for industry effects and as a 
robustness check, I employ three alternative measures of comparability. I use (1) 
FSCOMP10, computed as the average of top-10 firms’ FSCOMP score (e.g., De Franco et 
al. 2011 p.901); (2) COMP_INDMEAN, which is the average FSCOMP of all firm i's 
FSCOMP scores in the same two-digit SIC group; and (3) COMP_INDMDN, which is the 
median FSCOMP score for all firms j in the same two-digit SIC group as firm i. The results 
of these tests are reported in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 8, Panel A. The coefficients 
on all comparability measures are significantly negative, indicating that the results of out 
main regression presented in Table 3 are robust to alternative measures of comparability.  
Alternative measures of trade credit 
The documented result in my analysis may be driven by the choice of trade credit 
measures. To address this concern, I employ three alternative measures of trade credit. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Love et al. 2007; Molin and Preve 2012), I use TC2, 
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computed as accounts payable (AP) scaled by cost of goods sold (COGS), TC3 calculated 
as accounts payable (AP) divided by total current liabilities (LCT), and TC4 computed as 
accounts payable (AP) plus notes payable (NP) divided by total assets (AT). The results, 
reported in Table 8, Panel B, are consistent with my results presented in Table 3.  
Additional control variables 
Because my results may be driven by omitted variables, I rerun my tests after 
including the additional control variables SALEGROWTH, INV_TURN, AP_TURN, 
INFOASYM, and PROFIT (prior studies by Smith 1987; Petersen and Rajan 1997; and 
Molina and Preve 2012 find that these variables are associated with TRADE CREDIT).  
The results of these tests are reported in Table 8, Panel C. In each instance the coefficient 
on FSCOMP4 is significantly negative.  
II. 5. Summary 
This investigation examines the effect of financial statement comparability on trade 
credit. How financial statement comparability influences trade credit is a topic worthy of 
examination given the sheer magnitude of trade credit as a financing mechanism, and the 
fact that trade credit is generally a costly alternative to external financing. I find an overall 
negative relation between financial statement comparability and trade credit. I also find a 
negative relation between comparability and trade credit for two groups of firms that 
known to rely significantly on trade credit: distressed firms and small firms. The findings 
I document are significant both statistically and economically, and are robust to 
consideration of alternative measures of comparability and trade credit. These findings add 
to my understanding of how comparability impacts economic behavior - specifically the 
role of financial statement comparability in short-term financing decisions. In addition, my 
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results support the financing motive theory, in that suppliers extend credit to firms that 
have lower quality accounting and are credit rationed. They further support standard 
setters’ commitment to making accounting systems comparable across firms (FASB 2010). 
I also provide evidence that suppliers are indifferent to financial statement comparability – 
a finding that should be of solace to small or distressed firms.  
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
 
 
 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
TRADE CREDIT Accounts payable (AP) devided by total assets (AT). 
TC2 Accounts payable (AP) divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) 
TC3 Accounts payable (AP) divided by total current liabilities (LCT) 
TC4 Accounts payable (AP) plus notes payable (NP) divided by total 
assets (AT) 
FSCOMP4 Financial statement comparability score computed as in De 
Franco et al. (2011).  
SIZE Size of firm, computed as log of total assets (AT) 
MTB 
Market to book ratio, computed as (AT+CSHO*PRCC_F-CEQ-
TXDB)/AT 
|DAC| Discretionary accruals calculated from the modified jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995). 
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F) plus book value of total assets (AT) minus 
total common equity (CEQ) divided by book value of total assets 
(AT). 
CA Non-Cash Current Assets (ACT-OANCF) divided by book value 
of total Assets (AT) 
CASHHOLD Firm cash holdings, computed as cash and marketable securities 
(CHE) divided by total assets (AT) 
ROA Profitability, computed as net income (NI) divided by total assets 
(AT) 
CL_XTRADE Current liabilities (LCT) minus accounts payable (AP) divided by 
total assets (AT) 
LEVERAGE Ratio of long term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities 
(DLC) to total assets (AT) 
LIQUIDCOST Raw materials (INVRM) divided by total assets (AT) 
AGE Firm age, computed as the log of the number of years elapsed 
(plus one) since the year of firms’ first listing in CRSP 
MARKETSHARE Firm sales over total industry sales where industry classification 
is based on Fama-French’s 48 industry classification. 
COMPETITION Firm competition, computed as the log of the number of common 
shares outstanding (CSHO) 
POS_SALE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in sales (SALE - 
LAG of SALE) is positive and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Differences: High versus Low 
Comparability 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of my variable of interest and of the control variables used in the 
baseline regressions. The sample reflects data for the years 1987 through 2015. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 n Mean Std.Dev. Min P25 Median P75 
TRADE CREDIT 38748 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.10 
FSCOM4 38748 -0.53 0.51 -1.62 -0.70 -0.29 -0.13 
SIZE 38748 5.27 2.11 0.00 3.72 5.11 6.68 
MTB 38748 1.95 1.19 0.84 1.10 1.51 2.35 
TOBINQ 38748 0.47 3.05 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.24 
|DAC| 38748 1.96 1.17 0.87 1.12 1.53 2.36 
CA 38748 0.56 0.34 0.03 0.31 0.51 0.75 
CASHHOLD 38748 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.34 
ROA 38748 -0.02 0.18 -0.58 -0.06 0.03 0.09 
CL_XTRADE 38748 0.17 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.23 
LEVERAGE 38748 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.33 
LIQUIDCOST 38748 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 
AGE 38748 16.58 7.65 4.00 10.00 15.00 26.00 
MARKETSHARE 38748 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
COMPETITION 38748 39.59 43.28 2.48 8.28 20.86 53.52 
POS_SALE 38748 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Differences: High versus Low 
Comparability 
  
Panel B – Test of Differences: High versus Low Comparability 
 
This table presents the univariate tests on the differences of variables used in equation (1) between firms with 
high financial statement comparability and low financial statement comparability.  High Comparability is an 
indicator variable takes the value of 1 if FSCOMP4 if greater than median FSCOMP4, and Low 
Comparability otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate the level of significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Appendix A defines the variables.  
 
 
Variable 
 
High Comparability 
 
Low Comparability 
 
Mean 
Difference 
 
 
t-value Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
TRADE CREDIT 0.067 0.05 0.084 0.06 -0.017*** -30.64 
SIZE 5.764 2.03 4.782 2.08 0.982*** 46.99 
MTB 2.096 1.18 1.798 1.17 0.298*** 24.93 
|DAC| 0.434 2.80 0.498 3.27    -0.064** -2.08 
TOBINQ 2.114 1.17 1.811 1.16 -0.303*** -25.68 
CA 0.532 0.32 0.581 0.36 -0.049*** -14.24 
CASHHOLD 0.222 0.22 0.205 0.21 0.017*** 7.80 
ROA 0.031 0.13 -.078 0.20 0.109*** -62.58 
CL_XTRADE 0.166 0.11 0.181 0.13 -0.014*** -11.23 
LEVERAGE 0.186 0.19 0.231 0.22 -0.045*** -21.21 
LIQUIDCOST 0.046 0.05 0.044 0.05 0.002*** 4.62 
AGE 17.487 7.74 15.677 7.45 1.81*** 23.43 
MARKETSHARE 0.003 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.001*** 30.33 
COMPETITION 44.668 45.71 34.591 40.13 10.076*** 23.05 
POS_SALE 0.594 0.49 0.449 0.50 0.145*** 28.88 
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Table 2 - Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at p ≤ 0.01. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 TRADECREDIT 1.00                
2 FSCOM4 -0.17 1.00               
3 SIZE -0.18 0.18 1.00              
4 MTB -0.08 0.14 -0.09 1.00             
5 TOBINQ -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.05 1.00            
6 |DAC| -0.08 0.15 -0.09 1.00 0.05 1.00           
7 CA 0.15 -0.03 -0.42 0.34 0.03 0.33 1.00          
8 CASHHOLD -0.28 0.07 -0.18 0.44 0.04 0.43 0.60 1.00         
9 ROA -0.09 0.29 0.37 -0.22 -0.04 -0.21 -0.37 -0.20 1.00        
10 CL_XTRADE 0.15 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.25 0.01 -0.05 1.00       
11 LEVERAGE 0.07 -0.13 0.22 -0.15 0.00 -0.15 -0.17 -0.35 0.01 0.20 1.00      
12 LIQUIDCOST 0.28 0.04 -0.20 -0.14 -0.02 -0.14 0.21 -0.22 0.15 0.04 0.03 1.00     
13 AGE 0.01 0.10 0.34 -0.17 0.03 -0.16 -0.24 -0.26 0.25 -0.04 0.04 0.10 1.00    
14 MARKETSHARE 0.01 0.00 0.57 -0.13 -0.04 -0.12 -0.32 -0.28 0.23 0.01 0.20 -0.11 0.27 1.00   
15 COMPETITION -0.16 0.08 0.74 0.16 0.05 0.17 -0.25 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.26 0.19 0.41 1.00  
16 POS_SALE -0.02 0.13 0.38 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.15 -0.08 0.20 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.14 0.21 0.25 1.00 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 3 - Baseline Regressions 
 
Panel A: OLS and Tobit regression [Column (1) to Column (2)] 
 
This table presents the results of the regression of equation (1), which shows the impact of financial statement 
comparability on trade credit. Column (1) presents results of OLS regression with industry and year fixed 
effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Column (2) presents results of Tobit regression, where the value 
of trade credit is censored at 0. The t-values are calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, *** indicate significance levels 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable=TRADE CREDIT 
 
(1)  (2) 
OLS Tobit 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-
value 
FSCOMP4 -0.012*** -11.52  -0.013*** -24.42 
SIZE -0.005*** -7.44  -0.003*** -11.12 
MTB 0.113*** 7.39  0.121*** 13.94 
|DAC|   0.000 -0.07    0.000 0.50 
TOBINQ -0.112*** -7.22  -0.121*** -13.79 
CA 0.061*** 20.49  0.066*** 53.68 
CASHHOLD -0.135*** -31.98  -0.144*** -76.95 
ROA   0.000 0.12  0.005*** 2.71 
CL_XTRADE 0.018*** 3.57  0.016*** 7.49 
LEVERAGE -0.015*** -5.74  -0.017*** -12.44 
LIQUIDCOST 0.080*** 4.14  0.094*** 14.35 
AGE   0.000 -1.12    0.000 -0.84 
MARKETSHARE 0.359*** 6.43  0.210*** 11.86 
COMPETITION 0.000** 1.70  0.000*** 3.03 
POS_SALE 0.005*** 8.76  0.004*** 7.56 
CONSTANT   0.016 0.61  0.067*** 17.40 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes   
Adj. R2 0.329   
Log likelihood   62355 
Pseudo R2    
Observations 38,158  38,398 
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Table 3 - Baseline Regressions 
 
Panel B: Fama-McBeth and Logit regression [Column (3) to Column (4)] 
 
This table presents the results of the regression of equation (1), which shows the impact of financial statement 
comparability on trade credit. Column (3) presents the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression with 
industry fixed effects. Column (4) reports the results of logistic regression, where Prob_TradeCredit is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s trade credit is greater than the industry mean of trade 
credit in the same 2 digit SIC group for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise.  The t-values are calculated 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable=TRADE CREDIT 
 
(3)  (4) 
Fama-McBeth Logit 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. z-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.013*** -12.40  -0.400*** -9.42 
SIZE -0.004*** -13.17  -0.145*** -5.72 
MTB 0.103*** 10.33  5.577*** 6.65 
|DAC| 0.008*** 2.97  0.013*** 2.81 
TOBINQ -0.102*** -10.19  -5.539*** -6.54 
CA 0.065*** 23.28  2.097*** 18.32 
CASHHOLD -0.134*** -45.26  -5.133*** -27.57 
ROA   0.003 0.57   -0.144 -1.06 
CL_XTRADE 0.015*** 4.94  0.830*** 4.11 
LEVERAGE -0.014*** -13.08  -0.580*** -4.77 
LIQUIDCOST 0.096*** 8.01  4.923*** 6.84 
AGE 0.000*** -2.64    0.000 -0.01 
MARKETSHARE 0.380*** 15.81  14.770*** 6.18 
COMPETITION 0.000*** 3.63    0.000 -0.09 
POS_SALE 0.005*** 6.60  0.209*** 7.47 
CONSTANT 0.056*** 17.56  -2.457*** -3.88 
Year FE   Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.201    
Pseudo R2   0.1395 
Observations 38,158  38,142 
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Figure 1: Distribution of TRADE CREDIT 
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Table 4 - Quantile Regressions 
 
Panel A: Quantile 10th to 25th  
 
This table presents the results of quantile regressions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
Quantile regression 
 A  B 
 10
th 25
th 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.002*** -7.72 -0.005*** -13.70 
SIZE  0.000 1.60  -0.001*** -3.35 
MTB 0.038*** 10.29  0.060*** 20.82 
|DAC|  0.000 1.43  0.000*** 2.20 
TOBINQ -0.038*** -10.36  -0.060*** -20.53 
CA 0.020*** 22.00  0.034*** 35.27 
CASHHOLD -0.043*** -31.93  -0.073*** -62.56 
ROA  0.002** 2.11   0.003** 2.55 
CL_XTRADE 0.008*** 7.03  0.013*** 7.81 
LEVERAGE -0.004*** -6.53  -0.007*** -7.42 
LIQUIDCOST 0.121*** 25.66  0.148*** 34.21 
AGE 0.000*** 6.85  0.000*** 7.95 
MARKETSHARE 0.807*** 14.45  1.108*** 19.40 
COMPETITION 0.000*** -5.52   0.000* -1.78 
POS_SALE 0.001*** 6.68  0.002*** 6.17 
Constant  0.019 12.70  0.029*** 12.19 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Firm cluster Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.111  0.161 
Observations 38,698  38,698 
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Table 4 - Quantile Regressions 
 
Panel B: Quantile 50th to 90th  
 
This table presents the results of quantile regressions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
Quantile regression 
C  D  E 
50th 75th 90th 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.010*** -15.77 -0.020*** -14.44 -0.033*** -18.22 
SIZE -0.002*** -6.57  -0.005*** -8.42  -0.007*** -9.47 
MTB  0.092** 17.44  0.110*** 12.72  0.144*** 9.79 
|DAC|  0.000** 2.28   0.000 1.38   0.000 -0.40 
TOBINQ -0.092*** -16.92  -0.109*** -12.37  -0.143*** -9.54 
CA 0.056*** 36.04  0.090*** 32.22  0.115*** 30.02 
CASHHOLD -0.120*** -62.40  -0.180*** -45.18  -0.228*** -55.97 
ROA 0.009*** 3.96  0.015*** 3.38  0.016** 2.46 
CL_XTRADE 0.019*** 11.51  0.019*** 6.74  0.017*** 2.84 
LEVERAGE -0.011*** -9.95  -0.017*** -7.76  -0.031*** -7.97 
LIQUIDCOST  0.135 21.07  0.083*** 6.91   0.011 0.77 
AGE 0.000*** 3.27  0.000*** -2.87  -0.001*** -7.61 
MARKETSHARE 1.192*** 11.33  1.219*** 8.07  1.790*** 7.32 
COMPETITION  0.000 1.52  0.000*** 4.68  0.000*** 2.71 
POS_SALE 0.002*** 4.38  0.004*** 5.72  0.005*** 4.66 
Constant  0.051*** 25.74  0.088*** 25.12   0.132*** 18.76 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm cluster Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.174  0.188  0.221 
Observations 38,698  38,698  38,698 
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Table 5 – Endogeneity Controls 
Panel A - Lag Value of Financial Statement Comparability on Trade Credit. 
This table presents the results of the impact of lag value of financial statement comparability score on trade 
credit. Column (1) presents the results of the impact of lag value of FSCOMP4 on the TRADE CREDIT. 
Column (2) reports the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with industry fixed effects. All 
continuous variables are winorized at the 1st and 99th percentile level. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
level of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
(1)  (2) 
OLS Fama-McBeth 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Lag(FSCOMP4) -0.001** -2.53  -0.002*** -3.12 
SIZE -0.004*** -6.32  -0.004*** -10.92 
MTB 0.136*** 8.54  0.119*** 9.44 
|DAC|   0.000 0.48  0.009*** 2.84 
TOBINQ -0.137*** -8.52  -0.121*** -9.42 
CA 0.065*** 20.84  0.070*** 18.57 
CASHHOLD -0.144*** -33.30  -0.147*** -43.32 
ROA  -0.005 -1.32   -0.002 -0.26 
CL_XTRADE 0.020*** 4.10  0.016*** 3.84 
LEVERAGE -0.013*** -4.58  -0.010*** -6.60 
LIQUIDCOST 0.093*** 4.99  0.078*** 11.19 
AGE   0.000 -0.87  0.000*** -2.45 
MARKETSHARE 0.268*** 5.70  1.292*** 7.93 
COMPETITION 0.000** 2.08  0.000*** 3.67 
POS_SALE 0.004*** 5.51  0.004*** 3.74 
CONSTANT   0.077*** 17.42  0.084*** 41.91 
Year FE Yes   
Industry FE Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2/R2  0.265  0.146 
Observations 38,697  38,697 
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Table 5 - Endogeneity Controls - Panel B - Firm-fixed effects  
This tables presents the results of firm-fixed effect regressions of financial statement comparability on trade 
credit. In column (1) the dependent variable is TRADE CREDIT computed as accounts payable (AP) divide 
by total assets (AT). In column (2) the dependent variable is TOTAL CREDIT computed as the sum of 
accounts payable (AP) and notes payable (NP) divided by total assets (AT). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-values reported are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
 Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
 
(1)  (2) 
TRADE CREDIT TOTAL CREDIT 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.011*** -13.25 -0.008*** -8.92 
SIZE -0.010*** -16.35  -0.010*** -11.62 
MTB 0.001*** 5.40   0.000 1.30 
|DAC|  0.000 -1.36  0.000*** -3.20 
CA 0.020*** 7.74  0.016*** 6.82 
CASHHOLD -0.039*** -10.46  -0.039*** -10.05 
ROA -0.005*** -2.67  -0.005** -2.32 
CL_XTRADE 0.013*** 3.27  0.075*** 14.08 
LEVERAGE -0.006*** -3.71  -0.001 -0.57 
LIQUIDCOST 0.103*** 8.60  0.065*** 4.91 
AGE 0.001*** 8.08  0.012*** 3.02 
MARKETSHARE 0.404*** 7.81  0.379*** 4.80 
COMPETITION  0.000 -0.84   0.000 -1.66 
POS_SALE 0.002*** 5.95  0.002*** 5.43 
Constant 0.100*** 23.88  0.057*** 2.58 
Year Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
Firm Cluster Yes   Yes  
Firm Fixed Effect Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2 0.220   0.080  
Observations 38,698   38,650  
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Table 5 - Endogeneity Controls - Panel C - Instrumental Variable Regressions 
This table presents the results of instrumental variable estimation of financial statement comparability 
(FSCOMP4) on trade credit. Column (1) reports the first stage regression results, and column (2) presents 
the second stage regression results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
First Stage = FSCOMP4 and Second Stage = TRADE CREDIT 
 (1)   (2) 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
SIZE 0.032*** 13.13 Predicted(FSCOMP4) -0.024*** -5.04 
MTB -0.899*** -11.29  MTB 0.054*** 4.05 
PROFIT 0.622*** 10.50  SIZE -0.010*** -13.67 
|DAC|    -0.001 -1.36  |DAC|   0.000* -1.81 
Z-Score 0.041*** 24.47  TOBINQ -0.049*** -3.61 
ROA -0.121*** -2.75  CA 0.036*** 18.56 
CL_XTRADE -0.280*** -14.01  CASHHOLD -0.089*** -31.04 
LEVERAGE -0.302*** -24.14  ROA 0.000 0.02 
AGE 0.002*** 6.27  CL_XTRADE 0.013*** 3.64 
MARKESHARE -16.149*** -16.27  LEVERAGE -0.018*** -7.27 
BVE 0.000*** 8.97  LIQUIDCOST 0.122*** 8.28 
LIQUIDCOST    -0.024 -0.62  AGE 0.000 0.78 
TOBINQ 0.967*** 12.01  MARKETSHARE 3.503*** 9.74 
GROWTH 0.119*** 12.15  COMPETITION 0.000 0.43 
SOX -0.118*** -21.97  POS_SALE 0.002*** 5.27 
CRISIS 0.051*** 5.50     
REGUL -0.213*** -17.99     
Constant -0.750*** -54.32   0.070 2.08 
Year Fixed Effect Yes    Yes  
Firm Fixed Effect     Yes  
Industry Fixed 
Effect   
  Yes  
Adj. R2 0.212    0.363  
Observations 38,599    38,061  
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Table 6 - Change in Trade Credit and Changes in Comparability 
This table reports the results from the change regression where: IN_TRADE CRDIT is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the change in trade credit from year t-1 to t is positive and 0 otherwise; and DEC_TRADE 
CREDIT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in trade credit from year t-1 to t is negative, and 0 
otherwise. ∆ indicates the change in a variable from the year t-1 to t. Column (1) presents the results of the 
impact of changes in financial statement comparability on the changes in trade credit. Column (2) presents 
the results of a logit regression of changes in financial statement comparability on an increase in trade credit. 
Column (3) presents the results of a logit regression of changes in financial statement comparability on a 
decrease in trade credit. The column (1) has fewer observations because of missing continuous variables 
whereas column (2) and (3) are 0’s and 1’s. Variables are defined in Appendix A. All specifications include 
firm cluster and year fixed effects. The t-statistics reported in the table are calculated based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
s
i
g
n 
Dependent Variable=∆TRADE CREDIT, INCREASE or DECREASE 
in TRADE CREDIT 
(1) s
i
g
n 
(2) s
i
g
n 
(3) 
TRADE CREDIT 
(OLS) 
IN_TRADE CREDIT 
(Logit) 
DEC_TRADE 
CREDIT 
(Logit) 
Coeff. 
t-
value 
Coeff. t-
value 
Coeff. t-value 
∆FSCOM4 - -0.002*** -2.34 - -0.079** -1.957 + 0.075** 1.86 
∆SIZE  -0.017*** -14.18  1.350*** 20.76  -1.361*** -20.87 
∆MTB  0.022** 2.27  2.575*** 3.81  -2.602*** -3.84 
∆|DAC|  0.000*** -3.18      0.005 1.62     -0.005 -1.60 
∆TOBINQ  -0.020*** -2.00  -2.649*** -3.88  2.674*** 3.91 
∆CA  0.015*** 9.98  -0.864*** -11.09  0.863*** 11.05 
∆CASHHOLD  -0.054*** -20.83  -1.236*** -9.73  1.241*** 9.76 
∆ROA  -0.015*** -6.53  -0.501*** -4.51  0.507*** 4.56 
∆CL_XTRADE  0.009*** 3.03  -1.233*** -7.62  1.251*** 7.73 
∆LEVERAGE  -0.010*** -5.12  -0.710*** -6.17  0.706*** 6.13 
∆LIQUIDCOST  0.142*** 9.69  -6.885*** -8.74  6.893*** 8.75 
∆AGE  0.001*** 3.05  -0.070*** -2.73    0.065** 2.54 
∆MARKETSHARE  0.223*** 4.50  18.676*** 5.59  -18.738*** -5.61 
∆COMPETITION    0.000 -1.47  0.007*** 4.34  -0.007*** -4.37 
POS_SALE    0.000 -1.55  0.117*** 4.98  -0.113*** -4.80 
Constant    0.005* 1.64  1.517* 1.88     -1.507* -1.86 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
 
 
    
Firm Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.1106       
Pseudo R2    0.055  0.055 
Observations  31,860  32,279  32,279 
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Table 7 - Cross section analysis: Financial Distress and Firm Size 
This table presents the cross-sectional variation of the impact of accounting comparability on TRADE 
CREDIT by financial distress and firm size. Financial distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the interest 
coverage ratio is less than 0.8, and 0 otherwise. Size_small is equal to 1 if size is less than the median size, 
and 0 otherwise. The t-values are calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A.   
 
 
Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
(1)  (2) 
Financial Distress Small Size Firms 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4×DISTRESS -0.007*** -3.38   
DISTRESS    -0.001 -0.46    
FSCOMP4×SIZE_SMALL
    -0.009*** -3.55 
SIZE_SMALL      0.002 0.81 
FSCOMP4 -0.012*** -10.23  -0.012*** -10.45 
SIZE -0.003*** -4.77  -0.002** -2.25 
MTB 0.119*** 7.43  0.122*** 7.66 
|DAC|     0.000 -0.03    0.000 0.11 
TOBINQ -0.118*** -7.35  -0.122*** -7.59 
CA 0.067*** 21.36  0.067*** 21.38 
CASHHOLD -0.144*** -32.40  -0.143*** -32.30 
ROA 0.010*** 2.68  0.007** 2.01 
CL_XTRADE 0.014*** 3.00  0.014*** 2.98 
LEVERAGE -0.016*** -5.83  -0.016*** -5.84 
LIQUIDCOST 0.079*** 4.26  0.081*** 4.42 
AGE     0.000 -0.76     0.000 -0.85 
MARKETSHARE 1.263*** 4.90  1.023*** 3.93 
COMPETITION     0.000 0.67     0.000 -0.24 
POS_SALE 0.004*** 6.17  0.004*** 6.31 
Constant 0.072*** 15.54  0.066*** 13.34 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.277  0.276 
Observations 38,698  38,698 
β1 − β2 = 0 
(F-statistics=16.75) 
p<0.000 
 F-statistics=23.65) 
p<0.000 
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Table 8 – Robustness Tests: Panel A - Alternative measures of Trade Credit 
 
The results in this table are based on equation (1) with alternative measures of TRADE CREDIT. In Column 
(1), TC2 is calculated as accounts payable (AP) divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) as used in prior studies 
(e.g., Love et al. 2007; Molina and Preve 2012), in column (2), TC3 is calculated as accounts payable (AP) 
divided by total current liabilities (LCT), and in column (3), TC4 is calculated as (AP+NP)/AT. The t-values 
are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 TC2 TC3 TC4 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.011*** -7.25 -0.013*** -5.03 -0.012*** -10.92 
SIZE   0.001 1.44  -0.009*** -6.00  0.117*** 6.87 
MTB   0.029 1.11      0.017 0.34  -0.004*** -6.93 
|DAC| 0.000*** -2.38  0.001*** 3.44    0.000 0.09 
TOBINQ  -0.025 -0.95    -0.012 -0.23  -0.119*** -6.90 
CA 0.020*** 5.44  0.178*** 28.95  0.061*** 22.02 
CASHHOLD -0.021*** -3.49  -0.244*** -25.30  -0.156*** -38.53 
ROA -0.020*** -3.56  0.081*** 9.77     0.003 0.84 
CL_XTRADE 0.017** 2.25  -0.730*** -62.62  0.116*** 21.13 
LEVERAGE 0.014*** 3.19  0.017** 2.45   -0.001 -0.47 
LIQUIDCOST  -0.046* -1.88  0.359*** 8.62  0.120*** 7.03 
AGE -0.001*** -8.23  -0.001*** -3.37    0.000 1.56 
MARKETSHARE  -0.527 -1.23  5.589*** 7.31  1.575*** 5.74 
COMPETITION 0.000*** 6.39    0.000** -2.40  0.000*** 3.20 
POS_SALE -0.003*** -3.32  0.008*** 5.11  0.002*** 3.68 
Constant 0.094*** 2.86  0.337*** 3.96  0.081*** 16.86 
Year Fixed 
Effect Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effect Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.174  0.442  0.380 
Observations 38,338  38,697  38,650 
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Table 8 – Robustness Tests: Panel B - Alternative measures of Financial Statement 
Comparability 
The regression results in this table present alternative measures of financial statement comparability. Column 
(1) presents FSCOMP10, calculated as the average of FSCOMP scores of the top-10 firms. Column (2) 
presents COMP_INDMEAN, which is the average FSCOMP of all firm i’s FSCOMP scores in the same two-
digit SIC group. Column (3) presents COMP_INDMDN, computed as the median FSCOMP scores for all 
firms j in the same two-digit SIC group as firm i. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Dependent variable = TRADE CREDIT 
 FSCOMP10  COMP_INDMEAN  COMP_INDMDN 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP -0.010*** -5.44 -0.005*** -4.88 -0.004*** -4.90 
SIZE -0.009*** -5.90  -0.009*** -5.92  -0.009*** -5.82 
MTB   0.016 0.32    0.023 0.46     0.021 0.42 
|DAC| 0.001*** 3.39  0.001*** 3.24  0.001*** 3.32 
TOBINQ -0.010 -0.21   -0.018 -0.36   -0.016 -0.32 
CA 0.178*** 28.98  0.178*** 28.96  0.178*** 28.93 
CASHHOLD -0.244*** -25.31  -0.245*** -25.42  -0.245*** -25.43 
ROA 0.082*** 9.91  0.082*** 9.85  0.086*** 10.27 
CL_XTRADE -0.731*** -62.61  -0.730*** -62.53  -0.730*** -62.59 
LEVERAGE 0.017** 2.41  0.018** 2.52  0.017** 2.50 
LIQUIDCOST 0.360*** 8.64  0.357*** 8.58  0.358*** 8.60 
AGE -0.001*** -3.33  -0.001*** -3.31  -0.001*** -3.27 
MARKESHARE 5.560*** 7.28  5.574*** 7.28  5.565*** 7.27 
COMPETITION 0.000** -2.45  0.000** -2.49  0.000** -2.55 
POS_SALE 0.008*** 5.13  0.008*** 5.09  0.008*** 5.09 
Constant 0.335*** 3.92  0.332*** 3.88  0.334*** 3.91 
Year Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2 0.442   0.441   0.441  
Observations 38,697   38,697   38,697  
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Table 8 Robustness Tests: Panel C - Additional Control Variables [Column (1) to 
(2)] 
 
This table presents the results of my regression of comparability on trade credit after including additional 
control variables. Those variables are: SALEGROWTH, calculated as (Sale-lag_Sale)/lag_Sale; 
INV_TURN, computed as COGS/INVRM; AP_TURN, calculated as COGS/AVERAEG AP; INFOSYSM, 
the bid-ask spread; and PROFIT, calculated as NI/AT.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 SALEGROWTH INV_TURN 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.013*** -12.35 -0.012*** -9.72 
MTB 0.113*** 6.78 0.105*** 5.26 
SIZE 0.003*** -4.90  -0.001 -1.57 
SALEGROWTH 0.000*** 3.40   
INVENTORY_TURN   0.001*** 18.05 
|DAC|  0.000 0.46   0.000 0.99 
TOBINQ -0.113*** -6.71 -0.106*** -5.23 
CA 0.071*** 21.04 0.049*** 14.75 
CASHHLD -0.150*** -31.68 -0.118*** -26.45 
ROA  0.004 1.24 -0.017*** -4.42 
CL_XTRADE 0.015*** 2.90 0.026*** 4.20 
LEVERAGE -0.021*** -6.00 -0.016*** -4.86 
LIQUIDCOST 0.072*** 3.88 0.379*** 15.24 
AGE  0.000 -0.97 0.000*** -2.99 
MARKESHARE 1.190*** 4.55   0.444 1.56 
COMPETITION  0.000 1.08 0.000** 2.07 
POS_SALE 0.002*** 3.60 0.003*** 4.10 
Constant 0.071*** 14.95 0.030*** 5.65 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.272 0.319 
Observations 34,149 28,185 
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Table 8 Robustness Tests: Panel C - Additional Control Variables [Column (3) to 
(5)] 
 
This table presents the results of my regression of comparability on trade credit after including additional 
control variables. Those variables are: SALEGROWTH, calculated as (Sale-lag_Sale)/lag_Sale; 
INV_TURN, computed as COGS/INVRM; AP_TURN, calculated as COGS/AVERAEG AP; INFOSYSM, 
the bid-ask spread; and PROFIT, calculated as NI/AT.  
 
 (3) (4) (5) 
 AP_TURNOVER INFOASYM PROFIT 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
FSCOMP4 -0.016*** -7.09 -0.016*** -3.48 -0.021*** -8.28 
MTB -0.147*** -3.30   0.011 0.09    -0.055 -1.01 
SIZE -0.005*** -3.70  -0.003 -0.85 -0.005*** -3.29 
AP_TURNOVER -0.010*** -43.84     
INFOASYM   -0.007** -2.35   
PRPFIT     0.139*** 6.00 
|DAC| 0.001*** 3.37   0.001 0.61   0.001** 2.46 
TOBINQ 0.151*** 3.36   0.002 0.02     0.058 1.05 
CA 0.178*** 31.23 0.163*** 14.19 0.172*** 26.65 
CASHHLD -0.257*** -28.36 -0.234*** -10.78 -0.266*** -26.62 
ROA 0.120*** 15.96   0.013 0.73    -0.011 -0.62 
CL_XTRADE -0.756*** -68.52 -0.801*** -41.05 -0.775*** -68.08 
LEVERAGE 0.020*** 3.24 0.056*** 3.61 0.024*** 3.22 
LIQUIDCOST 0.242*** 6.82 0.138** 2.06     0.331 8.42 
AGE     0.000 0.79    0.000 -0.95     0.000 -1.39 
MARKESHARE 2.555*** 4.03    0.575 0.32   1.517** 2.07 
COMPETITION 0.000*** -5.64    0.000 1.57     0.000 0.14 
POS_SALE   0.003** 2.31    0.002 0.58     0.002 1.46 
Constant 0.515*** 48.24 0.438*** 18.94 0.415*** 34.52 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.503 0.379 0.384 
Observations 38,638 6,757 38,697 
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III. ESSAY 2: ACCOUNTING COMPARABILITY AND CLASSIFICATION 
SHIFTING 
III. 1. Motivation 
 Accounting researchers have extensively investigated earnings management 
through manipulation of accounting accruals (Schipper 1989; Jones 1991; Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997; Dechow et al. 1995; Becker et al. 1998; Heal and Wahlen 1999; Degeorge 
et al. 1999; Cohen et al. 2008) and through real activities management (Roychowdhury 
2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010; Zang 2011; Zhu and Lu 2013; Pacheco and 
Wheatley 2017). Existing literature (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2011; Ipino and 
Parbonetti 2011) confirms that managers use alternative forms of earnings management 
when one of them is constrained or seems costly.  
Cohen et al. (2008), for example, find that accrual-based earnings management 
increased until the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, after which the 
magnitude significantly declined. In contrast, earnings management resulting from altering 
operating decisions declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after. The Chairman 
of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, in a speech in 1998, discussed five of the more popular earnings 
management techniques: "big bath" restructuring charges, creative acquisition accounting, 
"cookie jar reserves," "immaterial" misapplications of accounting principles, and the 
premature recognition of revenue.16 Booking excessive restructuring charges and later 
reversing them is also an earnings management technique (Moehrle 2002).  
Researchers have, further, shown that managers engaged in the misclassification 
of core expenses to manage earnings (e.g., McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010). This type of 
                                                          
16 Please read the full speech at: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt 
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earnings management—classification shifting—has attracted the attention of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 
1721 in February 26, 2003 states, for example:  
“SmarTalk falsely reported net income of $478,000 in its quarterly report for the third 
quarter of 1997. In fact, SmarTalk had losses that period. As Folck knew or should have 
known, SmarTalk hid the losses by improperly capitalizing ordinary operating expenses. 
The expenses were improperly treated as an asset (SEC 2003)”.17 
The SEC has released a number of litigation releases regarding the improper classification 
or misstatement of operating expenses and net income (e.g., SafeNet, Inc. in 200918; 
Symbol Technologies, Inc. in 201019), yet even after the SEC expressed concerns about the 
market consequences of classification shifting, studies in this area are limited, (e.g., McVay 
2006; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011; Behn et al. 2013).  
  After the initial evidence of classification shifting found by McVay (2006) and Fan 
et al. (2010), studies have shown that classification shifting is affected by: external 
monitoring (Zhao 2012), analyst following (Behn et al. 2013), audit quality (Haw et al. 
2011), and board and audit committee quality (Zalata and Roberts 2016). There is no 
evidence, however, on whether financial statement comparability, an enhanced qualitative 
characteristic of accounting information, is associated with classification shifting.  
Comparability is the enhancing qualitative characteristic of accounting information 
that enables users to identify similarities and differences between two sets of economic 
                                                          
17 For more information https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8196.htm  
18 For more information: https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21290.htm. 
19 For more information: https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21480.htm 
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phenomena (FASB 2010). Prior studies document that accounting comparability works as 
monitoring, and the extant literature documents significant relationships between financial 
statement comparability and a number of characteristics/activities. De Franco et al. (2011) 
find that analyst following is associated with comparability. Zhang (2012) finds an 
association with audit fees. Other research links comparability to: IFRS adoption (Brochet 
et al. 2013), Credit risk (Kim et al. 2013), valuation of seasoned equity offerings (Shane et 
al. 2014), stock-price crash risk (Kim et al. 2016), and the efficiency of acquisition 
decisions (Chen et al. 2016). Still other research has linked comparability to debt 
contracting (Fang et al. 2016), accrual based and real earnings management (Sohn 2016), 
the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings (Choi et al. 2017), and the cost of 
equity capital (Imhof et al. 2017).  
While Sohn (2016) addresses the impact of comparability on accrual based and real 
earnings management, no research of which I am aware, has investigated whether there is 
an association between comparability and earnings management though classification 
shifting. This study fills that gap by extending Sohn (2016) and by investigating the 
association between financial statement comparability and classification shifting. I predict, 
and find, that comparability increases the peer monitoring of firms and, as a consequence, 
reduces classification shifting.  
Prior studies find that both internal and external monitoring mitigate classification 
shifting. Behn et al. (2013) find, for example, that higher financial analyst monitoring 
mitigates classification shifting. Using data from East Asian countries, Haw et al. (2011) 
find that Big4 audit firms and strong legal institutions play a role in mitigating 
classification shifting. Zalata and Roberts (2016), investigate UK Corporate behavior and 
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find that high quality internal governance (in terms of board and audit committees) 
moderates classification shifting.  
Prior studies (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011) and regulators (SEC 
2003) find that managers engage in earnings management through classification shifting. 
Abernathy et al. (2014), for example, find that 21% of firms engage in classification 
shifting. When, however,firms are more comparable, they become benchmarks for each 
other which subsequently fosters more peer monitoring. This greater peer monitoring 
reduces information asymmetry (Kim et al. 2016), rendering comparable firms less likely 
to exhibit excessive deviations in core earnings. Prior studies on accounting comparability 
also show that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring information 
(Brochet et al. 2013), makes firms better benchmarks for each other (Shane et al. 2014), 
increases the quantity and quality of information and analyst following (De Franco et al. 
2011), reduces information asymmetry (Kim et al. 2016), and facilitates information 
processing (Fang et al. 2016). Based on this evidence, I expect that comparability will be 
associated with a lower incidence of classification shifting.  
 Financial statement comparability establishes a form of monitoring and reduces 
information asymmetry (Brochet et al. 2013; Shane et al. 2014; Fang et al. 2016), and 
therefore curbs opportunistic behavior by management. Although there is evidence that 
financial statement comparability mitigates accrual-based earnings management and real 
activities management (Sohn 2016), there is no prior evidence on whether accounting 
comparability is also mitigates classification shifting. The difference between accrual-
based earnings management [AEM], real activities management [REM] and classification 
shifting is important because, unlike the first two forms of earnings management, 
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classification shifting is a disclosure issue that does not process through accounting system 
and does not affect bottom line earnings. As a consequence, classification shifting is more 
difficult to verify (Athanasakou et al. 2009; Zalata and Roberts 2016, p. 52).  
To test whether accounting comparability is associated with classification shifting, 
I first classify firms as shifters and non-shifters. In making this classification, I follow the 
studies of McVay (2006), Fan et al. (2010), Abernathy et al. (2014), and Alfonso et al. 
(2015). That research posits that a positive relation between unexpected core earnings and 
income-decreasing special items is an indicator of likely classification shifting. I classify a 
firm as a shifter if its unexpected core earnings are positive (actual core earnings less 
expected core earnings) and the change in special items (special item of year t less special 
items of year t-1) is positive for fiscal year t. In additional analysis, I follow Fan and Liu 
(2017), and employ alternative measures of classification shifting: cost of goods sold 
classification shifting, and operating expense classification shifting. I adopt De Franco et 
al.’s (2011) proxy for financial statement comparability that is built on the idea that the 
output of comparable financial reporting systems (e.g., earnings) should be similar for 
firms with similar economic events. Using a sample of 34,686 firm-year observations, I 
find (consistent with Abernathy et al. 2014) that 18% of firms engage in classification 
shifting. I also find that financial statement comparability is significantly negatively 
associated with shifters. I find that 36% of the firms engage in cost of goods sold 
classification shifting (CS_COGS) and 14% of the firms engage in general and 
administrative expense classification shifting (CS_XSGA). I also find that financial 
statement comparability is significantly negatively associated with CS_COGS and 
CS_XSGA. To establish a link between financial statement comparability and 
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classification shifting, I test whether governance is associated with comparability. I find 
that governance is significantly, positively associated with comparability.  
Certain unobserved characteristics that affect firms’ financial statement 
comparability may, however, also affect firms’ earnings management strategy via 
classification shifting. Sohn (2016) states, for example, that the results of accounting 
comparability and earnings management can be biased to the extent that the accounting 
variable is endogenous. I address this issue by first, using the lag of accounting 
comparability as my measure of comparability, and second by conducting two-stage least-
squares regressions. The results of those regressions yield qualitatively similar results to 
those of my OLS regressions. This suggests that accounting comparability and 
classification shifting are unlikely to be subject to significant endogeneity problems.  
I contribute to the financial statement comparability and classification shifting 
literature in several ways. First, this study extends the research of Sohn (2016) that 
investigates the association between financial statement comparability and AEM and 
REM. Sohn (2016) finds that accounting comparability is negatively associated with 
accrual-based earnings management and positively associated with real activities 
management. The distinction between traditional earnings management (AEM and REM) 
and classification shifting is important because both AEM and REM alter the bottom line 
of the income statement while classification shifting does not. For this reason, regulators, 
auditors, and researchers have paid less attention to classification shifting prior to McVay’s 
(2006) research and the SEC’s litigation releases related to shifting. 
Second, this study provides new insights to the classification shifting literature with 
respect to the association between monitoring or governance and classification shifting. 
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While prior studies (Haw et al. 2011; Zhao 2012; Behn et al. 2013) find that both internal 
and external governance, and audit quality are associated with classification shifting, no 
study has yet examined the impact of accounting comparability on classification shifting 
despite the evidence that comparability works as monitoring tool (De Franco et al. 2011; 
Kim et al. 2014; Zhang 2012; Fang et al. 2016; Sohn 2016).  
Third, this study enlarges the scope of the accounting comparability literature. 
There are two streams of research on accounting comparability. One stream has treated 
accounting comparability as the outcome of an event (e.g., Callao et al. 2007; Cascino and 
Gassen 2010; Lang et al. 2010; DeFond et al. 2011; Yip and Young 2012; Ahmed et al. 
2013), while the other has treated comparability as a determinant (De Franco et al. 2011; 
Kim et al. 2014; Fang et al. 2016; Sohn 2016; Imhof et al. 2017). De Franco et al. (2011) 
measured output based comparability and find that it explains analysts’ firm selection 
behavior and forecast properties. Other studies (Kim et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2016) find that 
accounting comparability works as a monitoring tool. This study adds to the literature of 
the usefulness of assessing accounting comparability by examining its effect on 
classification shifting.  
Finally, this study has implications for regulators. The Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 2 states: “Information about an enterprise gains greatly in 
usefulness if it can be compared with similar information about other enterprises..., and the 
significance of information depends to a great extent on the user’s ability to relate it to 
some benchmark” (FASB 1980, p. 26). In addition, the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 8 states that: “Comparability is a qualitative characteristic that enhances the 
usefulness of information that is relevant and faithfully represented” and “…information 
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about a reporting entity is more useful if it can be compared with similar information about 
other entities and with similar information about the same entity for another period or 
another date” (FASB 2010, p.19). Thus, if regulators wish to set accounting standards so 
as to improve financial reporting quality, they should be apprised of the effect of 
comparability on earnings management via classification shifting.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses literature review 
and hypothesis development. Section III explains the measures main variables and 
empirical specification. Section IV describes the sample selection procedure whereas 
section V explains the results of univariate and multivariate results. Section VI discusses 
the channel through which accounting comparability is associated with classification 
shifting. Section VII performs additional analyses, and the final section VIII concludes the 
study. 
III. 2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Financial Statement Comparability 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 states that 
comparability is a qualitative characteristics of accounting information (FASB 1980), and 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 states comparability as an 
enhancing qualitative characteristic (FASB 2010). FASB defines financial statement 
comparability as the extent to which an information user can recognize the similarities and 
differences in the financial performance of two firms. SFAC No. 8 states that “Investing 
and lending decisions essentially involve evaluations of alternative opportunities, and they 
cannot be made rationally if comparative information is not available.” (FASB 2010, p. 
26). One of the objectives of accounting information is to help investors to compare 
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performance of two firms so that they can make informed decisions. The US FASB and 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) developed a common conceptual 
framework, based on and built on both the IASB framework and the FASB framework, 
and mentioned comparability as an important decision useful qualitative characteristic of 
financial information (FASB 2010). Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
emphasized on the comparability of financial statements across firms. SEC Chairman, 
Mary Jo White, in her Public Statement on January 5, 2017, for example, states that 
“Building high-quality, globally accepted accounting standards requires that the 
Commission support further efforts by the FASB and IASB on convergence between their 
accounting standards to enhance the quality and comparability of financial reporting – both 
domestically and across borders.” (SEC 2017).  
Other qualitative characteristics (e.g., value relevance, persistence, predictability), 
compared to comparability, have received more attention in accounting literature. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001), for example, mentions 62 papers on value relevance 
published in top tier journals, whereas by that time there were very little empirical evidence 
on comparability. Despite the importance of comparability in the conceptual framework of 
accounting (FASB 1980, 2010), to the regulators, and academic researcher (Schipper 
2003), prior literature has paid much less attention to the financial statement comparability. 
The paucity of research on the accounting comparability was due to lack of a standard 
comparability measure. Schipper (2003), for example, expressed the concern as follows: 
“However, until we can measure the amount of comparability obtained for 
a given level of detailed guidance, we will not be well armed with evidence 
on which to base discussions about the desirability of limiting the amount 
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of detail provided in standards, when the intent of that detail is increased 
comparability.” (Schipper 2003, p. 68) 
After the development of De Franco et al. (2011) measure of financial statement 
comparability, the researchers respond to the call of Schipper (2003) for more research on 
accounting comparability. There are two streams of research on accounting comparability. 
One of the streams has investigated the impact of an event (e.g., IFRS adoption) on 
accounting comparability. Accounting amounts are comparable if, when two firms face the 
same economic outcomes, the firms report similar accounting amounts (Barth et al. 2012). 
One of the most important objectives of IFRS is to promote international comparability of 
financial reporting, which is the demand of capital market globalization (Nobes and Parker 
1995). The IASB claims that IFRS is more likely to improve cross-country financial 
reporting comparability; however, some researchers (e.g., Ball et al. 2000, 2003; Leuz et 
al. 2003; Ball 2006; Holthausen 2009; Hail et al. 2010) highlight the significant role of 
institutional features (such as auditing, enforcement, institutions, market efficiency) in 
shaping the outcomes of IFRS implementation. Different application of IFRS is expected 
due to different institutional features; therefore, the comparability may not improve. Barth 
et al. (2012) add to this line and argue that because of inherent flexibility of IFRS, which 
is a principle-based accounting standard, financial reports based on IFRS are less likely to 
be comparable. Financial statement comparability research following IFRS is a response 
to this tension. The majority of studies (e.g., Cascino and Gassen 2010; Yip and Young 
2012; Barth et al. 2013; Brochet et al. 2013) finds that the financial statement comparability 
has improved after IFRS adoption. Such findings are not surprising, since the most 
expectable consequence of a single set of accounting standards is the enhancement of 
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financial statements comparability. However, few studies (e.g., Callao et al. 2007; Carlin 
and Finch 2008) document that the comparability has not improved after IFRS adoption. 
Barth et al. (2012) find that greater accounting comparability is found to firms that are 
having strict enforcement and are from common law countries. Cascino and Gassen (2012) 
find that increased comparability is found for firms with incentives for greater accounting 
quality. Whatever maybe the research design, the main purpose of these studies was to find 
out whether accounting quality—comparability—has increased after the adoption of IFRS.  
The other stream of research has examined the impact of accounting comparability 
on many financial and economic phenomena. Since comparability lowers information 
acquisition and processing cost, enhances the quality of information available to investors, 
allows meaningful comparison among firms, increases number of analysts following, 
enables analysts to sharper inferences about economic similarities and differences across 
comparable firms, researchers have shown the association between comparability and 
financial and economic variables. The existing literature, for example, documented a 
significant relation between financial statement comparability and (1) analyst following 
(De Franco et al. 2011) (2) audit fees (Zhang 2012) (3) IFRS adoption (Brochet et al. 2013) 
(4) Credit risk (Kim et al. 2013) (5) valuation of seasoned equity (Shane et al. 2014) (6) 
crash risk (Kim et al. 2016) (7) efficiency of acquisition decisions (Chen et al. 2016) (8) 
debt contracting (Fang et al. 2016) (9) accrual based and real earnings management (Sohn 
2016) (10) informativeness of stock price about future earnings (Choi et al. 2017) (11) cost 
of equity capital (Imhof et al. 2017). Furthermore, because comparable firms become better 
benchmarks for each other, information transfer among them becomes easy and managers 
of comparable firms are less likely to alter core earnings that are highly deviated from the 
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peers. Higher comparability facilitates users to have more information about firms’ 
financial performance with less efforts (Kim et al. 2013).  
Classification Shifting 
Classification shifting is an earnings management technique in which managers 
intentionally misclassify cost of goods sold and operating expenses as special items within 
the income statement to improve core earnings. In general term, classification shifting can 
be achieved by shifting expenses down from recurring items to non-recurring items and 
alter core earnings instead of bottom line net income. Unlike recurring expenses such as 
cost of goods sold, non-recurring expenses such as restructuring charges are infrequent or 
transitory in nature and less sophisticated investors appear not to understand their nature 
and weight individual categories within the income statement differently (e.g., Bradshaw 
and Sloan 2002; Zalata and Roberts 2015). Classification shifting gets less attention from 
auditors and regulators since GAAP net income does not change. These might motivate 
managers to shift recurring expenses down to the non-recurring expenses, and thus alter 
core earnings. After the initial evidence in McVay (2006) consistent with the 
misclassification of recurring expense as non-recurring expense by showing a positive 
relation between unexpected core earnings and the income-decreasing special items, there 
are two streams of research on classification shifting. One of the streams (e.g., Fan et al. 
2010; Haw et al. 2011) provides additional evidence consistent with classification shifting. 
Using quarterly data and similar design, Fan et al. (2010) find that managers engage in 
classification shifting and the practice is more likely in the fourth quarter than in the interim 
quarter. They also provide evidence that classification shifting is more evidenced when 
managers’ ability to manipulate accruals appear to be constrained.  Based on sample from 
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East Asian countries, Haw et al. (2011) provide evidence that strong legal institution and 
Big4 auditors play role in mitigating the prevailing classification shifting. Analyzing U.K. 
firms, Athanasakou et al. (2009, 2011) find that firms use classification shifting to achieve 
analyst forecast. Other stream of research has investigated the factors affecting 
classification shifting (Zhao 2012; Behn et al. 2013; Zalata and Roberts 2016). Zhao 
(2012), for example, finds that when AEM and REM are constrained by increased external 
monitoring, they are more likely to engage in earnings management by classification 
shifting. However, using international sample of firms from 40 countries, Behn et al. (2013) 
find that higher financial analyst following mitigates classification shifting. Based on U.K. 
sample, Zalata and Roberts (2016) find that high quality internal governance in terms of 
overall quality of board and audit committee mitigates classification shifting. However, 
there is no evidence on how a firm’s financial statement comparability, an enhanced 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information, is associated with classification 
shifting. 
Hypothesis 
Existing literature (e.g., Lipe 1986; Elliot and Hanna 1996; Fairfield et al. 1996) 
suggests that earnings components close to sales in the income statement receive more 
attention by analysts and investors. Lipe (1986), for example, finds that income statement 
line items closer to sales are more persistent. Collins et al. (1997) find that the value 
relevance of bottom line earnings has declined over the years. Investors’ differential 
responses to earnings components suggest that these components have different 
implications for future profitability (Fairfield et al. 1996). Fan and Liu (2017) argue that 
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since earnings components closer to sales receive greater valuation multiples, managers 
may be incentivized to misclassify persistent expenses (COGS and/or SGA) as transitory 
income-decreasing special items to inflate their firms’ persistent profitability measures 
such as gross margin and core earnings (p. 404). Fan et al. (2010) provide evidence 
consistent with misclassification of core expenses when doing so allows firms to report 
core earnings that just meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast. Managers are motivated 
to achieve the benchmarks of zero earnings or prior-period core earnings or analyst 
forecasts (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Lopez and Rees 2002).  
Existing literature document that income increasing earnings management is 
negatively associated with a larger proportion of outside members (Marrakchi et al. 2001), 
board and audit committee members (Xie e tal. 2003), high corporate governance (Liu and 
Lu 2007), and number of audit committee meetings (Xie et al. 2003). However, using 
international sample of firms from 40 countries, Behn et al. (2013) find that higher financial 
analyst following mitigates classification shifting. Based on U.K. sample, Zalata and 
Roberts (2016) find that high quality internal governance in terms of overall quality of 
board and audit committee mitigates classification shifting. Studies on accounting 
comparability (e.g., Chen et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2014: Kim et al. 2016) assume that 
comparable firms are external monitors of each other.  
After the theoretical evidence in Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988) 
consistence with the notion that information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders is a precondition for the practice of earnings management, Richardson (2000) 
provides empirical evidence that when information asymmetry is high stakeholders do not 
have sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor 
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managers’ actions, which gives rise to the practice of earnings management. Studies on 
accounting comparability provide evidence that financial statement comparability reduces 
information asymmetry (e.g., Kim et al. 2013; Naranjo et al. 2013; Fang et al. 2016; Kim 
et al. 2016). Kim et al. (2013) document that accounting comparability decreases 
information asymmetry by enabling less informed investors to conduct simple and 
standardized but still effective financial analyses. Using international data, Naranjo et al. 
(2013) conclude that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) increased 
accounting comparability and ultimately reduces information asymmetry among capital 
market participants. Literature also provides evidence consistent with the notion that 
comparability reduces information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Fang et al. 
2016) and between peer firms (Chen et al. 2016). Financial statement comparability also 
deters managers from bad news hoarding (Kim et al. 2016).  
Existing literature in many disciplines has empirically provided evidence 
consistence with the view that individual and firm behavior is modified by peer effects 
(Manski 2000; Falk and Ichino 2006; Leary and Roberts 2014). Falk and Ichino (2006) and 
Beshears et al. (2015) document that individual behavior is affected by peer effects. Manski 
(2006) theoretically provides evidence that the action chosen by a firm can affect the 
constraints, expectation, and/or preferences of its economically related peers. Leary and 
Roberts (2014) find that a firm’s financing decisions are responses to the financing 
decisions and characters of peer firms. De Franco et al. (2011) find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in their comparability measure is associated with a 5% increase in the 
probability of being selected as a peer (p. 897). Peer companies are benchmarked against 
one another and against the target based on various financial metrics of performance (Chen 
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et al. 2016). Peer firm effect works very well. If firm A is a peer of firm B, firm A is more 
likely to follow firm B. Studies have document that peer firm effects are prominent in case 
of earnings management. Gleason et al. (2008), for example, find that firms with 
comparable peers with high accruals experience more pronounced share price decline than 
do low-accrual firms. Suppose firm A and B are highly comparable. If firm B reports core 
earnings of $100 million, firm A is more likely to show almost same core earnings since 
their economic situations are same. Since comparable firms are peers of each other and are 
better benchmarks, their financial decisions are also affected by peers’ financial decisions.  
Financial statement comparability measure is positively associated with analyst 
following (De Franco et al. 2011). De Franco et al. (2011) find that the likelihood of analyst 
using another firm in the industry (say, firm j) as benchmark when analyzing a particular 
firm (say, firm i) is increasing—albeit modestly—in the comparability between two firms 
(p. 897). Prior studies find that analysts play a role of information intermediaries in 
corporate governance and serve as external monitoring to managers. Based on multiple 
measures of earnings management, Yu (2008), for example, find that firms followed by 
more analysts are less likely to manage earnings. 
 When the accounting system and its outcomes are comparable with those of other 
firms, the outside market participants such as analysts, potential investors, peer firms, and 
regulators can assess the firm’s true economic performance by comparing the accounting 
information of the firm and its peers (Sohn 2016). Comparable firms’ accounting 
environment becomes more transparent to peer groups and to the outsiders at large leaving 
managers less room to manipulate core earnings. In short, due to decrease in information 
asymmetry, increase in external monitoring, increased peer effects, and increase in analyst 
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following, highly comparable firms are less likely to manipulate core earnings. Prior 
studies assumed that the ability for classification shifting is homogenous across firms and 
such practices are less likely to attract monitors’ and regulators scrutiny (Zalata and 
Roberts 2016). After analyzing prior studies, I argue that the ability to classification 
shifting is not the same across all firms and accounting comparability may play a role in 
mitigating classification shifting. Based on the above discussion, my testable formal 
hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows: 
H1: Comparable firms are less likely to classification shift. 
III. 3. Research Design 
Financial Statement Comparability 
I follow the De Franco et al. (2011) measure of financial statement comparability, 
which is based on the earnings-returns relationship of paired firms. De Franco et al. (2011) 
develop an empirical model based on the assumption that for a given set of economic 
events, two firms produce similar financial results. Following De Franco et al. (2011), I 
first estimate the following:  
Earningsit = αi + βiReturnit + εit                                                 (2) 
where Earnings is the quarterly net income before extraordinary items (IBQ) scaled by 
beginning of the period market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO), and Return is the 
respective quarter’s stock return. I calculate α̂i and β̂i for firm i and in the same way I 
estimate α̂j and  β̂j for firm j. I then use these parameters to estimate expected earnings of 
firm i and j. I use the Return of firm i and the parameters of i and j to compare the Earnings 
of firm i and j as follows: 
E(Earnings)iit = α̂i + β̂iReturnit                                                      (3) 
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E(Earnings)ijt = α̂j + β̂jReturnij                                                         (4) 
Keeping the economic event, Returnit, constant, I calculate predicted earnings of 
firm 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 for the period t. Then I compute the accounting comparability between firm 
i and j (FSCOMP4ijt) from the following: 
FSCOMPijt=-
1
16
* ∑|E(Earnings
iit
)-E(Earnings
ijt
)|
t
t-15
                                                         (5) 
The smaller the difference between the predicted earnings of i and j, the more 
comparable are the two firms’ accounting systems. I estimate comparability for each 
firm i-firm j combination for J firms within the same two-digit SIC industry classification. 
Then I rank all J values of FSCOMPijt for each firm 𝑖 from the highest to lowest. Next I 
calculate FSCOMP4it as the average of highest four comparability score of 
firm i with firm j. I also compute FSCOMP10, COMP_INMDN, and COMP_INDMEAN. 
The detailed calculations of these measures are defined in Appendix A.  
Classification Shifter 
To identify classification shifter firms, I follow core earnings level model developed in 
prior studies (e.g., (McVay 2006; Abernathy et al. 2014). I use the following model for 
each industry-year:  
CEt=β0+β1CEt-1+β2ATOt+β3WCAt-1+β4WCAt+β5SALEt+β6NEG_SALEt+εt  (5) 
Where CEt is core earnings, which is equal to sales less COGS and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses, scaled by sales. ATOt is asset turnover ratio, WCA is working 
capital accruals, which is equal to change in total current assets net of change in cash, minus 
change in current liabilities net of change in the current portion of long term debt, scaled 
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by total assets. SALEt is the percentage change in sales and NEG_SALEt is the percentage 
change in sales when the change in sales is negative to allow for different slope coefficients 
for sales increases and decreases?  The model is estimated cross-sectional by industry and 
fiscal year. Unexpected core earnings (U_CE) is determined for each firm-year by 
subtracting the predicted core earnings from the estimation of equation (5) from the actual 
core earnings reported. Prior studies (e.g, McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010) suggest that for 
classification shifters, their unexpected core earnings (U_CE
t+1
) are expected to be 
positively associated with special items (SPIt). Therefore, following prior studies (McVay 
2006; Fan et al. 2010; Abernathy et al. 2014; Athanasakou et al. 2011), I classify firms as 
income classification shifters if they have positive U_CE
t+1
 and positive change in income 
decreasing special items.  
To identify cost of goods sold classification shifters, I follow Fan and Liu (2017) 
and use the following model: 
COGSt=α0+α1 (
1
At-1
) +α2COGSt-1+α3ACCRt+α4ACCRt-1+α5RETt 
+ α6RETt-1+α7SALEt+α8∆SALEt+α9NEG_SALEt+μt               (6) 
where COGSt is cost of goods sold in year t scaled by At-1. ACCR is total accruals obtained 
from income before extraordinary (IB) items minus cash flows from operation scaled by 
beginning of the year total assets, and cash flows from operations (OANCF) is obtained 
from COMPUSTAT. RET is the market adjusted annual return calculated from monthly 
return from CRSP. ∆SALE is the change in sales from year t-1 to the year t. NEG_SALE 
is the change in sales if change is less than zero, and zero otherwise. I run the model by 
industry-fiscal year and unexpected cost of goods sold (U_COGS) is determined for each 
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firm-year by subtracting the predicted cost of goods sold from the estimation of equation 
(6) from the actual cost of goods sold reported. I classify firms as COSG_SHIFTER if the 
U_COGS is negative and change in special items is positive.  
 I also identify selling, general, and administrative expense classification shifting by 
following the following model: 
XSGAt=α0+α1 (
1
At-1
) +α2XSGAt-1+α3ACCRt+α4ACCRt-1+α5RETt 
+ α6RETt-1+α7SALEt+α8∆SALEt+α9NEG_SALEt+μt         (7) 
where XSGA is selling, general, and administrative expense scaled by beginning of the 
year total assets. I run the model by industry-fiscal year and unexpected selling, general, 
and administrative expense (U_XSGA) is determined for each firm-year by subtracting the 
predicted XSGA from the estimation of equation (7) from the actual XSGA reported. I 
classify firms as XSGA_SHIFTER if the U_XSGA is negative and change in special items 
is positive.  
Regression Specification 
Following prior literature (Pan 2013; Abernathy et al. 2014), I use the following 
logit model to test the impact of accounting comparability on classification shifting: 
 (ProbCSt=1) =α0+α1Comp_Acctt+α2Assetst+α3LongTenuret 
+α4Inst_holdt+α5Analystt+α6Taxratet+α7ROAt 
+α8HighNoat+α9Regult+α10Litigationt+α11SOXt 
+α12CFO_Forecastt+α13MktSharet+α14MTBt+α15OpCyclet
 
+α16Big4t+α17Stockt+α18ROEt+α19Leveraget+α20Losst 
+α21CFOAt+α22Z_Scoret+εt                                                  (8) 
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where CS is equal to one if the unexpected core earnings (U_CE) is positive and change in 
special items is positive. Comp_Acct is either Comp_Acct4, which is the average firm i’s 
four highest comparability score during year t, or Comp_Ind, which is the average of all 
firm i’s comparability scores during year t. Appendix A explains other variables. I include 
Assets (Log of COMPUSTAT AT) in my model because prior studies (e.g., 
Warfield et al. 1995; Beasley et al. 2000; Francis and Yu 2009; Barton and Simko 
2002; Mayers et al. 2007) suggest that firm size affect managers’ earnings 
management behavior. Since auditor tenure at a firm is associated with opportunistic 
behavior of managers (e.g., Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Chen et al. 2008; 
Davis et al. 2009; Jenkin and Velury 2008), I include LongTenure. Inst_hold is the 
percentage of institutional ownership, which has impact on earnings management 
(e.g., Chung et al. 2002; Velury and Jenkins 2006). Following prior studies, I 
include other control variables because they are associated with opportunistic 
behavior of managers. I use the following model to test whether financial statement 
comparability reduces CS_COGS: 
(ProbCSt=1) =α0+α1Comp_Acct4t+α2Assetst+α3LongTenuret 
+α4Inst_holdt+α5Analystt+α6Taxratet+α7ROAt 
+α8HighNoat+α9Regult+α10Litigationt+α11SOXt 
+α12CFO_Forecastt+α13MktSharet+α14MTBt+α15Op_Cyclet 
+α16Big4t+α17Stockt+α18ROEt+α19Leveraget+α20Losst 
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+α21CFOAt+α22Z_Scoret+εt                                                    (9) 
 
To test the impact of financial statement comparability on CS_XSGA, I use the following 
logistic regression model: 
(ProbCSt=1) =α0+α1Lagged_Comp_Acctt+α2Assetst+α3LongTenuret 
+α4Inst_holdt+α5Analystt+α6Taxratet+α7ROAt 
+α8HighNoat+α9Regult+α10Litigationt+α11SOXt 
+α12CFO_Forecastt+α13MktSharet+α14MTBt+α15Op_Cyclet 
+α16Big4t+α17Stockt+α18ROEt+α19Leveraget+α20Losst 
+α21CFOAt+α22Z_Scoret+εt                                                          (10) 
Sample Selection 
I started my analysis with 409,420 firm-year observations from COMPUSTAT. 
After matching with CRSP, IBES, and Thomson Reuters and deleting missing 
observations, my final sample consists of 34,686 firm-year observations. Following prior 
studies (McVay 2006; Abernathy et al. 2014; Athanasakou et al. 2011), I exclude financial 
firms, eliminate (1) observations with annual sales less than US$1 million, (2) change in 
fiscal year during the year, (3) total assets less than US$1 million, and (4) less than 15 
observations within the industry-year. Table 1 explains the detailed of sample selection.  
III. 4. Empirical Results 
Figure 1 exhibits that accounting comparability of shifter firms are less than those 
of non-sifter firms. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used for estimating 
regression in the analyses. The descriptive statistics are for the full sample of 34,686 firm-
year observations from 1988-2015. The statistics shows that eighteen percent of my sample 
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firms are classification shifters (Shifter=0.18). The mean and median of firm-year level 
financial statement comparability, i.e., Comp_Acct4, are -0.44 and -0.24 respectively, with 
a standard deviation of 0.47, suggesting that Comp_Acct4 is normally distributed. The 
mean and median of industry level comparability, Comp_Ind, is -2.07 and -1.59 
respectively. These values are consistent with prior studies (e.g., De Franco et al. 2011; 
Sohn 2015; Chen et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2016).  43% of my sample firm-year observations 
occurred during the post-SOX period (SOX=0.43). The average length of operating cycle 
(Op_Cycle) is 130.59 days, average size (log of total assets) is 6.34. Average number of 
analyst following of my sample firms is 9.91, 32% of the firms are litigation prone, and 
average Z-Score of my firm is 2.52, suggesting that most firms are in good health. 
Moreover, 36% of the firms are cost of goods sold classification shifters (CS_COGS=0.36) 
and 14% of the firms are selling, general, and administrative expense shifter 
(CS_XSGA=0.14).  
Table 3 provides Pearson correlation among the variables used in the regression 
analysis. The negative and significant correlation coefficient between Shifter and 
Comp_Acct4 (-0.04) suggests that firms with higher accounting comparability are less 
likely to engage in earnings management by classification shifting. The negative and 
significant correlation coefficient (-0.04) between Shifter and Analyst indicates that firms 
with higher analyst following are less likely to classification shift. The negative correlation 
of Shifter with Regul (-0.02) and litigation (-0.01) are consistent with hypothesis that firms 
in regulated industry and litigation prone industry are less likely to classification shift. The 
positive correlation coefficient between Assets (Log of Assets) and CFO_Forecast suggests 
that larger firms are more likely to have cash flow forecast. Finally, the negative correlation 
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(-0.03) between Shifter and Z-Score indicates that financially strong firms are less likely to 
classification shift. Although the correlation coefficient between Shifter and Comp_Acct4 
indicate that they are negatively associated, the correlation between these two between 
these two variables does not consider other variables that might have impact on 
classification shifting. Therefore, we need multivariate regression analysis.  
Multivariate Results 
The results from my multivariate analysis to test my hypothesis are presented in 
Table 4. My hypothesis examines the impact of accounting comparability on classification 
shifting. Column (1) of Table 4 exhibits the results of the impact of Comp_Acct4 on 
classification shifting, and column (2) presents the results of the impact of Comp_Ind on 
classification shifting. The coefficient of       -0.500 on Comp_Acct4 is negative and highly 
significant (z=-13.62) suggests that comparable firms are less likely to engage in 
classification shifting. The coefficient of -0.180 on Comp_Ind is also negatively significant 
(z=-12.82), confirms the prior findings. Other variables such as Assets, LongTenure, 
Instl_hold, ROA, HIghNoa, SOX, MTB, Z-Score are significant consistent with prior 
studies. The negative and significant coefficient of -0.263 on Z-Score (z=-3.25), for 
example, suggests that firms with poor financial condition are more likely to 
opportunistically misclassify core expenses as non-recurring expenses.  
Endogeneity Issue  
Firms’ accounting comparability is the return-earnings relationship among the 
firms in each industry. Firms whose earnings attributes such as accruals quality, earnings 
predictability, and earnings smoothness are similar have similar accounting comparability 
(De Franco et al. 2011). Managers may alter the accruals quality by engaging them in 
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earnings management. It means that managers can apply different accounting methods and 
techniques that may affect the accounting comparability with other firms. As a result, 
earnings management by classification shifting may also affect accounting comparability. 
Managers who wish to manage earnings by classification shifting maybe involved in 
tempering accounting systems that can affect the return earning relationship, which 
ultimately move accounting comparability. From this critical analysis, it seems that 
classification shifting and accounting comparability are both endogenous.  
To test whether classification shifting and accounting comparability are endogenous, I 
conduct two tests. First, I re-run the baseline regression in Table 4 using the lagged values 
of Comp_Acct (both Comp_Acct4 and Comp_Ind). The most common approach to test for 
endogeneity is to lag the independent variable (Ben Shepherd 2010). The argument is that 
although the current period value of Comp_Acct might be endogenous to classification 
shifting, it is unlikely that past period values of Comp_Acct are also subject to the same 
problem. The results are presented in Table 5. The results are consistent with the previous 
results both for Comp_Acct4 and Comp_Ind and are significantly negative.  
Studies in econometrics (e.g., Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Miguel et al. 2004; 
Hamilton and Nickerson 2003) as well as in accounting (e.g., Anderson et al. 2004; Barton 
2001; Beatty et al. 1995; Darrough and Rangan 2005; DeFond et al. 2002; Haw et al. 2004) 
suggest using instrumental variables or two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to 
mitigate the biases caused by endogeneity of the predictor variables. I use 2SLS to alleviate 
the issue of endogeneity. In the first stage, I regress Comp_Acct on various instrumental 
variables and other variables that explain accounting comparability, and in the second 
stage, I use the predicted value of Comp_Acct for the main regression. Following prior 
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studies (e.g., Sohn 2016; Brown and Kimbrough 2011; Anderson et al. 2004), I use Assets, 
Loss, longTenure, Insl_hold, Analyst, Taxrate, ROA, HighNoa Regul, Litigation, SOX, 
MktShare, MTB, Operating Cycle, Big4, ROE, Leverage, and Z-Score because accounting 
comparability can vary with the variances of these variables. The adjusted 𝑅2 is 25.86%, 
which is higher than prior studies (Sohn 2016; Brown and Kimbrough 2011), suggesting 
that the instruments are well selected, and the coefficients of the variables are consistent 
with them. The coefficient of SOX is -0.053 (t= -9.28) and significant at 1% level whereas 
Sohn (2016) finds -0.0449 (t= -2.81). Coefficient on Regul is -0.072 (t=-7.71) and is 
consistent. I run the main regression of Table 4 and report the results in Table 6 second 
column. The coefficients on E(Comp_Acct) are significantly negative {Comp_Acct4 (-
5.109; t= -4.44) and Comp_Ind (-2.373; t= -4.44}, suggesting that firms having higher 
accounting comparability are less likely to classification shift.   
Channel Through Which Comparability is Associated with Classification Shifting 
In this section, I try to explain how financial statement comparability allows less 
room for managers to manipulate earnings through classification shifting. I provide 
evidence from prior literature that there is a link between the variables that directly affect 
earnings management.  
Less Information Asymmetry for Comparable Firm 
Prior studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2013; Naranjo et al. 2013; Fang et al. 2016; Kim et 
al. 2016; Chen et al. 2016) argue that financial statement comparability reduces 
information asymmetry; however, these studies do not provide empirical evidence of the 
association between accounting comparability and information asymmetry. Earnings 
management literature (e.g., Richardson 2000; Chu and Song 2010) provides empirical 
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evidence that higher information asymmetry does not allow stakeholders to have sufficient 
resources and incentives to access to the relevant information to monitor managers’ actions, 
giving rise to the practice of opportunistic managerial behavior--earnings management.  
To show empirical evidence on the association between information asymmetry and 
financial statement comparability, I calculate bid-ask spread from CRSP. I use only those 
firm-year observations that have fiscal year end on December 31. After matching with my 
sample data, I get only 18,636 firm-year observations. I use the following model for 
information asymmetry.  
InfoAsym
t
= δ0+δ1CompAcct4t
+δ2Big4t+δ3Instholdt+δ4Regult 
     +δ5Analystt+δ6CFO_Forecastt+δ7Litt+δ8HighNoat 
     +δ9MktSharet+δ10Specialistt+εt                     (11) 
Where InfoAsym is the difference between bid and ask price (from CRSP). Comp_Acct4 is 
the comparability measure. I have included Big4 because firms audited by Big4 firms are 
less likely to hoard information. Inst_hold, Regul, Analyst, CFO_Forecast, Lit, HighNoa, 
MktShare, and Specialist directly or indirectly affect the bid-ask price difference. My 
model is well fit because the adjusted R-squared is 54.75%.  Table 7 exhibits the results of 
regression analysis of InfoAsym on accounting comparability measure. From Table 7, I 
find that the coefficient on Comp_Acct4 is -.018, which is significantly negative (t=-6.67). 
The significantly negative coefficient suggests that information asymmetry decreases with 
the increase in accounting comparability. This finding suggests that earnings management 
through classification shifting decreases with the increase in accounting comparability.  
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Additional Analysis 
Does Accounting Comparability Decrease Cost of Goods Sold Classification Shifting? 
Table 8 reports the results of logistic regression of CS_COGS on the accounting 
comparability variable (Comp_Acct4) and control variables using equation (9) in column 
(1) and equation (10) in column, respectively. The coefficient on Comp_Acct4 is -0.135 
and significant at the 1% level (z-value=-4.48) in column (1), suggesting that managers are 
less likely to misclassify cost of goods sold as special items when their firms’ accounting 
is more comparable with that of other firms operating in the same industry. The negative 
(-0.191) and significant (-4.79) coefficient of Comp_Acct4 in column (2) indicates that 
managers of highly comparable firms reduce their general, administrative, and selling 
expense misclassification behavior. These findings suggest that financial statement 
comparability reduces overall classification shifting. I have also run both the regressions 
in equation (9) and (10) with lagged value of Comp_Acct4 and found that the results persist 
(Table 9 presents the results of lagged value of Comp_Acct4). I have also used 2SLS to 
alleviate the issue of endogeneity and found that the results are consistent with the previous 
results both for CS_COGS and CS_XSGA (Table 10 exhibits the results of 2SLS).  
Does SOX Act 2002 Play Moderating Role in the Association Between 
Comparability and Classification Shifting? 
Studies on the pre-and post-SOX period (Pincus and Rego 2008; Cohen et al. 2008; 
Cook et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2008) provide evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley Act has impact 
on opportunistic behavior of management. Since there are mixed findings on the 
association between SOX and earnings management (Cohen et al. 2008), we need to know 
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the impact of SOX on the association between comparability and classification shifting. To 
check whether SOX plays a role, I use the following model: 
(ProbCSt = 1) = α0 + α1CompAcctt ∗ SOX + α2CompAcct4t + α3SOXt 
+α4Assetst + α5LongTenuret + α6Instholdt + α7Analystt 
+α8Taxratet + α9ROAt +α10HighNoat + α11Regult 
+α12Litigationt + α13CFOForecastt + α14MktSharet 
+α15MTBt + α16OpCyclet + α17Big4t + α18Stockt 
+α19ROEt + α20Leveraget + α21Losst 
+α22CFOAt + α22Z_Scoret + εt                                                  (11) 
Table 11 presents the results of the logistic regression of the equation (11). The coefficient 
on Comp_Acct4*SOX is -0176 and is significant at the 5% level (z-value=-2.54) in column, 
suggesting that managers are incrementally less likely to misclassify recurring expenses as 
special items when their firms’ accounting is more comparable with that of other firms 
operating in the same industry. 
III. 5. Summary 
I investigate whether firms’ financial statement comparability with other firms 
affects earnings management through classification shifting. I argue that financial 
statement comparability decreases information asymmetry by enabling less informed 
investors to conduct simple and standardized but still effective financial analysis, increases 
external monitoring by increased number of analyst following. I also argue that high 
comparable firms become better benchmarks or peers for each other and the accounting 
environment becomes more transparent to peer groups and to the outsiders at large. 
Because of decreased information asymmetry, increased external monitoring, and 
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increased peer effects, managers have less room to manipulate core earnings. To find 
whether financial statement comparability mitigates classification shifting, I run logistic 
regression of three types of classification shifting—core expense shifting (Shifter), cost of 
goods sold shifting (CS_COGS), and selling, general, and administrative expense shifting 
(CS_XSGA), on accounting comparability. My results are consistent with my hypothesis 
that comparable firms are less likely to classification shift. To establish a channel between 
accounting comparability and classification shifting, I run regression of information 
asymmetry (InfoAsym) on accounting comparability (Comp_Acct4) and find that financial 
statement comparability reduces information asymmetry. To overcome endogeneity issue, 
I run the main regression using the lagged value of Comp_Acct4 and use two-stage least 
square regression. I find that the main results remain same. I also find that SOX has a 
moderating role in the association between accounting comparability and classification 
shifting.  
My findings have several implications for researchers as well as regulators. First, 
this study extends the study (Sohn 2016) that investigates the association between financial 
statement comparability and earnings management. Second, this study adds new evidence 
on the classification shifting literature that attempts to show the association between 
monitoring or governance and classification shifting. Third, this study expands the scope 
of accounting comparability literature. Finally, this study has implication for the regulators. 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 states, “. Information about an 
enterprise gains greatly in usefulness if it can be compared with similar information about 
other enterprises..., and the significance of information depends to a great extent on the 
user’s ability to relate it to some benchmark.” (FASB 1980, p. 26). The Statement of 
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Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 states that “Comparability is a qualitative 
characteristic that enhances the usefulness of information that is relevant and faithfully 
represented”, and “Users’ decisions involve choosing between alternatives, for example, 
selling or holding an investment, or investing in one reporting entity or another. 
Consequently, information about a reporting entity is more useful if it can be compared 
with similar information about other entities and with similar information about the same 
entity for another period or another date.” (FASB 2010, p.19). Extant literature finds many 
benefits of comparability (De Franco et al. 2011). However, while setting accounting 
standards to improve comparability between entity, the regulators need to know the effect 
of it on earnings management by classification shifting, which is also a concern of SEC, so 
that they can achieve the intended goals.  
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Appendix A - Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Comp_Acct4 Firm-year level measure of financial statement comparability, 
calculated as the average of the largest four comparability 
combination for firm i and other firms in the same 2-digit SIC 
in a given year. 
Comp_Ind Firm-year level measure of financial statement comparability, 
calculated as the median of comparability combinations for 
firm i and other firms  
Lagged Comp_acct Lag values of Comparability measures. 
E(Comp_Acct4) Expected value of Comp_Acct4, which is the expected value 
from the first stage instrumental regression of Cop_Acct4 
CE Core Earnings (before Special Items and Depreciation): (Sales 
– Cost of Goods Sold – Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses)/Sales, where Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, 
General and Administrative Expenses exclude Depreciation 
and Amortization. 
U_CE Unexpected Core Earnings is the difference between reported 
and predicted Core Earnings, where the predicted value is 
calculated using the coefficients from model (1) estimated by 
fiscal year and industry as follows: CEt =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 +
 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡−1  +  𝛽4𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where CE is Core Earnings; ATO is the 
Asset Turnover Ratio (sales divided by average operating 
assets); WCA is working capital accruals scaled by lagged 
assets (the change in total current assets net of the change in 
cash, minus the change in current liabilities net of the change 
in the current portion of long-term debt, divided by lagged 
total assets; Sales is percent change in Sales from the previous 
year; Neg_Sales is the negative percent change in Sales if that 
change is negative and zero otherwise. 
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Big4 Is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm is audited 
by a Big4 firm.  
CFO_Forecast Cash Flow from Operations Forecast, which is an indicator 
variable equal to one when the firm has cash flow forecasts in 
IBES, and zero otherwise. 
HighNOA High Net Operating Assets, which is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the beginning of the year NOA is greater than 
the industry median and zero otherwise.  
Inst_Hold Institutional ownership, calculated as the number of shares 
held by institutions divided by total shares outstanding. 
Assets Log of Assets, calculated as log of total assets.  
LongTenure Long Tenured Auditor, an indicator variable equal to one 
when audit tenure is more than 8 years, and zero otherwise. 
MktShare Firm’s percentage of its industry’s sales, calculated as the 
firm’s total sales divided by the industry total sales.  
MTB Market to book ratio. 
OpCycle Operating Cycle, calculated as the days receivable plus days 
in inventory at the beginning of the year. 
ROA Return on Assets, calculated as net income divided by total 
assets. 
OX Is an indicator variable equal to one if the fiscal year is 
greater than 2003, and zero otherwise. 
Shifter Is an indicator variable equal to one if U_CE is greater than 
zero and change in special items is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  
CS_COGS Classification Shifter of Cost of Gods Sold, which is an 
indicator variable equal to one if unexpected cost of goods 
sold is negative and the change in special items is positive.  
Unexpected cost of goods sold is measured as the residual 
from the following model for the expected cost of goods sold, 
estimated by industry-year: 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1(1/𝐴𝑡−1 )  + 𝛿2𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛿4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿6𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1
+ 𝛿7𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿8∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿9𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 
where, ACCR is the total accruals obtained from income 
before extraordinary items (IB) minus cash flows from 
operations, scaled by lag of total assets. RET is the annual 
market adjusted returns for the year.  
CS_XSGA Classification shifter of selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (xsga), and is an indicator variable equal to one if 
unexpected expenses are negative and the change in special 
items is positive. Unexpected xsga is the residual from the 
following model for the expected xsga, estimated by industry-
year: 
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𝑋𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1(1/𝐴𝑡−1 )  + 𝛿2𝑋𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛿4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿6𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1
+ 𝛿7𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿8∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿9𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 
Taxrate Total taxes paid divided by pre-tax net income constrained 
between 0 and 1.00.  
Regul Is an indicator variable equal to one if the two digit SIC is in 
the 40-49 range.  
Litigation Is an indicator variable equal to one if the four-digit SIC is 
within: 2833-2836; 3570-3577; 7370-7374; 3600-3674; or 
5200-5961. 
Analyst The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts 
following the firm.  
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to the 
book value of assets 
Loss An indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports negative 
net income during the year. 
SPI Special items divided by sales. 
Stock An indicator variable equal to one if stko is equal to zero. 
ACCR Total accruals calculated as net income before extraordinary 
item less cash flow from operations. 
Z-Score Altman’s Z-Score, calculated: ZSCORE = 3.3 * earnings 
before interest and taxes / total assets + 1.0 * sales divided by 
total assets + 1.4 * retained earnings divided by total assets + 
1.2 * working capital divided by total assets + 0.6 * market 
capitalization divided by total liabilities. 
CFOA Cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets.  
InfoAsym Is the different between bid-ask price. 
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Table 1 - Sample Selection 
 Observations 
Total observations available in COMPUSTAT - 1988 to 2015 409,420 
Less: Missing data to estimate core earnings (173,318) 
Less: Firms in financial industries (SIC 6000-6799) (83,245) 
Less: Missing data to estimate control variables: 
Assets  39 
ROA 5,911 
Institutional_hold 25,318 
Taxrate 49 
Analyst 23,309 
MktShare 5,891 
MTB 6,030 
Z-score 16,552 
Operating Cycle 11,027 
ROE 6,032 
Leverage 693 
CFOA 5,927 
Tenure 11,393 
Total 118,171 
 
(118,171) 
Total observations used in the analysis 34,686 
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
Shifter 34686 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Comp_Acct4 34686 -0.44 0.47 -1.62     -0.55 -0.24 -0.11 -0.06 
Comp_Ind 34686 -2.07 1.35 -5.52 -2.52 -1.59 -1.14 -0.67 
Assets 34686 6.34 1.81 1.53 4.99 6.18 7.51 13.08 
Loss 34686 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
longTenure 34686 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Inst_hold 34686 0.54 0.23 0.00 0.37 0.59 0.77 0.79 
Analyst 34686 9.91 1.64 6.78 8.94 10.41 11.27 11.62 
Taxrate 34686 0.27 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.33 0.38 0.45 
TOA 34686 0.02 0.12 -0.53 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.12 
HighNoa 34686 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Regul 34686 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Litigation 34686 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SOX 34686 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CFO_forecas 34686 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MktShare 34686 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 
MTB 34686 2.54 1.63 0.29 1.31 2.08 3.39 6.02 
Op_cycle 34686 130.59 75.82 0.00 74.13 117.06 170.61 342.25 
Big4 34686 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Stock 34686 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ROE 34686 0.00 0.13 -0.50 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.12 
Leverage 34686 0.32 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.25 0.57 0.86 
CFOA 34686 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.24 0.53 
Z-Score 33798 2.52 1.36 -0.53 1.66 2.59 3.61 4.40 
CS_COGS 34686 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CS_XSGA 34686 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Core Earnings 34686 0.24 0.40 -11.49 0.10 0.24 0.38 1.90 
UE_CE 34686 0.37 0.96 -0.82 -0.02 0.00 0.45 3.01 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Appendix A defines all the variables.  
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Table 3 - Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A: Correlation Variables (Shifter to Litigation) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Shifter 1.00            
2 Comp_Acct4 -0.04 1.00           
3 Assets -0.01 0.18 1.00          
4 Loss -0.05 -0.44 -0.19 1.00         
5 longTenure -0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.02 1.00        
6 Insti_Hold -0.04 0.15 0.51 -0.15 0.04 1.00       
7 Analyst -0.04 -0.13 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.24 1.00      
8 Taxrate 0.00 0.48 0.17 -0.48 0.01 0.09 -0.15 1.00     
9 ROA 0.08 0.50 0.21 -0.74 0.01 0.17 -0.07 0.48 1.00    
10 HighNoa 0.23 0.08 0.20 -0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.12 0.08 0.05 1.00   
11 Regul -0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 1.00  
12 Litigation -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.22 -0.14 -0.06 -0.18 1.00 
13 SOX -0.06 -0.12 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.38 0.55 -0.16 -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.06 
14 CFO_Forecast -0.02 0.00 0.42 -0.03 0.05 0.37 0.30 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
15 MktShare 0.00 0.22 0.55 -0.19 0.04 0.21 -0.11 0.23 0.19 0.20 -0.01 -0.35 
16 MTB -0.03 0.07 0.09 -0.13 0.01 0.14 0.07 -0.03 0.14 0.01 -0.04 0.16 
17 Op_cycle 0.01 0.00 -0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.23 0.04 
18 Big4 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.18 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.04 
19 Stock 0.00 0.13 0.16 -0.13 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
20 ROE 0.06 0.48 0.17 -0.73 0.02 0.17 -0.05 0.43 0.82 0.04 0.00 -0.11 
21 Leverage 0.01 0.07 0.82 -0.09 0.06 0.30 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.17 -0.17 
22 CFOA 0.00 -0.17 -0.26 0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.19 -0.30 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 0.40 
23 Z-Score -0.03 0.49 0.01 -0.52 0.01 0.10 -0.11 0.44 0.61 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 
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Table 3 (Continued) - Correlation Coefficients 
Panel B: Correlation Variables (SOX to Z-Score) 
 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
13 SOX 1.00           
14 CFO_Forecast 0.48 1.00          
15 MktShare -0.05 0.12 1.00         
16 MTB 0.06 0.08 0.01 1.00        
17 Op_cycle -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 1.00       
18 Big4 -0.22 -0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00      
19 Stock 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.00 1.00     
20 ROE -0.01 0.03 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.16 1.00    
21 Leverage 0.10 0.35 0.50 0.06 -0.13 0.02 0.09 0.08 1.00   
22 CFOA 0.19 0.01 -0.34 0.24 0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.32 1.00  
23 Z-Score -0.12 -0.06 0.18 0.29 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.47 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 4: Impact of Accounting Comparability on Classification Shifting 
 Comp_Acct4 Ind_Comp 
 Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
Comp_Acct -0.500*** -13.62 -0.180*** -12.82 
Assets -0.122*** -6.49 -0.128*** -6.81 
Loss -0.078 -1.28 -0.066 -1.08 
longTenure -0.088 -1.12 -0.101 -1.28 
Instl_hold -0.191** -2.16 -0.183** -2.08 
Analyst 0.005 0.38 0.005 0.37 
Taxrate -0.128 -1.04 -0.043 -0.34 
ROA 5.953*** 16.74 6.130*** 17.34 
HighNoa 1.636*** 39.27 1.633*** 39.24 
Regul -0.498*** -6.96 -0.476*** -6.65 
Litigation 0.005 0.12 -0.058 -1.53 
SOX -0.828* -1.82 -0.761 -1.67 
CFO_Forecast 0.036 0.79 0.028 0.62 
MktShare -1.582** -2.15 -0.689 -0.94 
MTB -0.036*** -3.26 -0.051*** -4.64 
Op_Cycle 0.000 0.28 0.000 -1.33 
Big4 -0.063* -1.93 -0.062* -1.90 
Stock 0.074 1.34 0.060 1.08 
ROE -0.201 -0.82 -0.193 -0.79 
Leverage 0.000*** 4.19 0.000*** 4.11 
CFOA 0.926*** 8.00 0.812*** 7.02 
Z-Score -0.263*** -15.53 -0.249*** -14.49 
Constant -0.567*** -3.25 -0.629*** -3.56 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
n 33,798 33,798 
Pseudo R-Squared 9.70% 9.63% 
   
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 5: Impact of Lagged Comp_Acct on Classification Shifting 
 Comp_Acct4 Ind_Comp 
 Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Lagged Comp_Acct -0.467*** -14.24 -0.167*** -14.03 
Assets -0.117*** -6.22 -0.120*** -6.36 
Loss -0.080 -1.32 -0.083 -1.35 
longTenure -0.087 -1.10 -0.099 -1.26 
Inst_hold -0.222*** -2.53 -0.215*** -2.45 
Analyst 0.004 0.30 0.004 0.34 
Taxrate -0.193 -1.57 -0.109 -0.88 
ROA 5.995*** 16.77 6.070*** 17.07 
HighNoa 1.639*** 39.30 1.639*** 39.32 
Regul -0.497*** -6.94 -0.480*** -6.69 
Litigation -0.008 -0.22 -0.061 -1.59 
SOX -0.556 -1.23 -0.591 -1.30 
CFO_Forecast 0.034 0.75 0.027 0.60 
MktShare -1.461** -1.99 -0.715 -0.98 
MTB -0.042*** -3.83 -0.055*** -4.94 
Op_Cycle 0.000 0.09 0.000 -1.28 
Big4 -0.061* -1.88 -0.060* -1.84 
Stock 0.063 1.13 0.052 0.93 
ROE -0.556** -2.29 -0.612*** -2.53 
Leverage 0.000*** 4.18 0.000*** 4.08 
CFOA 0.890*** 7.69 0.779*** 6.72 
Z-Score -0.261*** -15.40 -0.246*** -14.34 
Constant -0.643 -3.66 -0.743*** -4.17 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
n 33,798 33,798 
Pseudo R-Squared 9.75% 9.73% 
        
  *, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively.  Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A 
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Table 6 - First Stage and Second Stage Regressions 
First Stage 
Dependent variable =Comp_Acct4 
 Coefficient t-value 
Assets 0.041*** 15.96 
Loss -0.013 -1.61 
longTenure 0.042*** 3.88 
Inst_hold 0.149*** 12.35 
Analyst -0.005*** -3.34 
Taxrate 0.434*** 24.81 
ROA -0.364*** -9.71 
HighNoa 0.019*** 2.73 
Regul -0.072*** -7.71 
Litigation 0.103*** 19.81 
SOX -0.053*** -9.28 
MktShare -1.670*** -16.47 
MTB 0.025*** 17.32 
Op_Cycle 0.001*** 24.40 
Big4 -0.001 -0.19 
ROE 0.951*** 30.82 
Z-Score 0.061*** 26.08 
Constant -1.085*** -52.15 
Leverage 0.000*** -6.21 
n 33,798 
Pseudo R-Squared 25.86 
  
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.   
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Table 6 – (continued): Second Stage Regressions 
 
 Second Stage 
 Dependent variable: Shifter 
 Comp_Acct4 Ind_Comp 
 Coefficient z-vavalue Coefficient z-value 
E(Comp_Acct) -5.109*** -4.44 -2.373*** -4.44 
Assets 0.070* 1.90 0.046 1.44 
Loss -0.128** -2.04 0.065 0.97 
longTenure 0.102 1.10 0.011 0.14 
Inst_hold 0.499*** 2.42 0.498*** 2.42 
Analyst -0.022 -1.60 -0.085*** -3.57 
Taxrate 1.849*** 3.59 3.985*** 4.03 
ROA 4.335*** 7.86 6.990*** 17.50 
HighNoa 1.718*** 36.15 1.772*** 32.54 
Regul -0.831*** -7.47 -0.594*** -7.60 
Litigation 0.482*** 3.87 -0.296*** -4.35 
SOX -0.980** -2.14 -1.019** -2.22 
CFO_Forecast 0.008 0.18 0.008 0.18 
MktShare -9.331*** -4.38 0.283 0.38 
MTB 0.081*** 2.75 -0.109*** -5.75 
Op_Cycle 0.003*** 3.94 0.000 1.13 
Big4 -0.063* -1.93 -0.027 -0.82 
Stock 0.023 0.41 0.023 0.41 
ROE 4.232*** 3.79 5.048*** 3.89 
CFOA 0.842*** 7.32 0.842*** 7.32 
Z-Score 0.014 0.18 0.323** 2.24 
Constant -5.502*** -4.54 -8.033*** -4.52 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes 
n 33,798 33,798 
Pseudo R-
Squared 
9.12% 9.12% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 7: Channel Through Which Financial Statement Comparability is Associated 
with Classification Shifting 
 
Dependent Variable: Information Asymmetry (Bid-Ask Spread) 
 Coefficient t-value 
Comp_Acct4 -.018*** -6.67 
Big4 0.000 -0.08 
Inst_hold -0.062*** -8.97 
Regul 0.008 1.08 
Anal1 0.000 -0.64 
CFO_Forecast 0.015*** 5.38 
Lit 0.051*** 12.89 
HighNoa -0.013*** -2.78 
MktShare -0.020 -1.47 
Specialist 0.008*** 2.46 
Constant -.356*** -32.75 
Observations 18652 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 54.75% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 8 - Impact of Accounting Comparability on Cost of Goods Sold  
Classification Shifting 
 
 COGS XSGA 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Comp_Acct4 -0.135*** -4.48 -0.191*** -4.79 
Assets 0.069*** 4.74 0.112*** 5.61 
Loss -0.269*** -5.94 -0.277*** -4.14 
longTenure -0.027 -0.46 -0.067 -0.84 
Inst_hold 0.351*** 5.12 0.405*** 4.24 
Analyst -0.005 -0.47 0.011 0.83 
Taxrate -0.209* -2.13 -0.142 -1.05 
ROA 2.623*** 11.74 2.058*** 5.51 
HighNoa 0.157*** 4.14 0.140*** 2.85 
Regul -0.232*** -4.46 -0.811*** -10.17 
Litigation 0.061* 2.05 -0.065 -1.57 
SOX 1.030*** 3.44 0.520 1.28 
CFO_Forecast -0.037 -1.10 -0.062 -1.35 
MktShare 1.441*** 2.57 0.798 1.10 
MTB 0.029*** 3.48 -0.098*** -8.00 
Op_Cycle 0.002*** 9.29 -0.001*** -4.30 
Big4 -0.024 -0.95 0.010 0.30 
Stock 0.030 0.68 -0.034 -0.57 
ROE 0.611*** 3.35 0.190 0.69 
Leverage 0.000 -0.25 0.000* -2.17 
CFOA 0.662*** 7.36 -0.828** -6.25 
Z-Score -0.354*** -26.31 -0.096*** -5.28 
Constant -1.940*** -12.42 -2.476*** -12.25 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 33,798 33,798 
Pseudo R-Squared 4.69% 3.48% 
 
 *, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 9 - Impact of Lagged Comp_Acct4 on COGS_Shifter and XSGA_Shifter 
 COGS XSGA 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
l_comp4 -0.088*** -3.23 -0.153*** -4.22 
Assets 0.066*** 6.26 0.112*** 5.62 
Loss -0.269*** -5.96 -0.277*** -4.14 
longTenure -0.028 -0.48 -0.068 -0.85 
Inst_hold 0.344*** 5.09 0.393*** 4.12 
Analyst -0.005 -0.49 0.011 0.81 
Taxrate -0.236*** -2.43 -0.175 -1.30 
ROA 2.638*** 11.80 2.072*** 5.54 
HighNoa 0.157*** 4.14 0.140*** 2.85 
Regul -0.228*** -4.40 -0.809*** -10.13 
Litigation 0.055* 1.86 -0.070* -1.70 
SOX 1.084*** 3.63 0.607 1.49 
CFO_Forecast -0.040 -1.19 -0.064 -1.40 
MktShare 1.509*** 2.71 0.871 1.20 
MTB 0.027*** 3.26 -0.101*** -8.24 
Op_Cycle 0.002*** 9.10 -0.001*** -4.43 
Big4 -0.023 -0.93 0.011 0.33 
Stock 0.024 0.55 -0.041 -0.67 
ROE 0.503*** 2.78 0.048 0.17 
CFOA 0.651*** 7.32 -0.844*** -6.37 
Z-score -0.354*** -26.99 -0.097*** -5.28 
Constant -1.899*** -12.43 -2.469*** -12.12 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observation 33,798 33,798 
Pseudo R-Squared 4.67% 3.46% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 10 – Second Stage Regressions of Classification Shifting on Comparability 
 COGS XSGA 
 Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
E(Comp_Acct4) -5.946*** -27.16 -1.778*** -5.97 
Assets 0.308*** 18.00 0.176*** 7.58 
Loss -0.342*** -7.50 -0.292*** -4.34 
longTenure 0.215*** 3.62 -0.002 -0.03 
Inst_hold 1.221*** 15.76 0.641*** 6.02 
Analyst -0.036*** -3.69 0.002 0.12 
Taxrate 2.315*** 15.39 0.540** 2.61 
ROA 0.514** 2.50 1.482*** 4.22 
HighNoa 0.270*** 7.07 0.173*** 3.49 
Regul -0.653*** -11.66 -0.928*** -10.93 
Litigation 0.658*** 17.55 0.101* 1.94 
SOX 0.747** 2.50 0.468 1.15 
CFO_Forecast -0.044 -1.31 -0.072 -1.57 
MktShare -8.281*** -13.78 -1.885** -2.41 
MTB 0.174*** 15.64 -0.059*** -3.67 
Op_Cycle 0.006*** 24.70 0.000 0.43 
Big4 -0.028 -1.10 0.012 0.34 
Stock 0.016 0.37 -0.054 -0.89 
ROE 6.143*** 23.92 1.727*** 4.69 
Leverage 0.000*** -6.34 0.000*** -3.24 
CFOA 0.641*** 7.14 -0.853*** -6.44 
Constant -8.229*** -30.62 -4.169*** -11.70 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 33,798 33,798 
Pseudo R-Squared 3.40% 4.65% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in Appendix 
A.  
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Table 11: Impact of Comparability on Classification After the Passage of SOX 
 
Dependent Variable: Shifter 
 
 Coefficient z-value 
Comp_Acct4*SOX -0.176*** -2.54 
Comp_Acct4 -0.418*** -7.71 
SOX -0.920* -1.97 
Assets -0.121*** -5.48 
longTenure -0.088 -1.05 
Loss -0.083 -1.24 
Inst_hold -0.200* -2.00 
Analyst 0.005 0.37 
Taxrate -0.137 -1.03 
ROA 5.984*** 15.36 
Regul -0.497*** -5.18 
Lit 0.006 0.14 
CFO_Forecast 0.043 0.92 
HighNoa 1.633*** 32.85 
MktShare -1.556* -1.84 
MTB -0.037*** -3.00 
OperCycle 0.000 0.22 
Big4 -0.063* -1.70 
Stock 0.070 1.15 
ROE -0.239 -0.96 
Z-Score -0.263*** -13.44 
Leverage 0.000*** 3.56 
CFOA 0.924*** 7.23 
Constant  -.526*** -2.83 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes 
Observations 33798 
Pseudo R-Squared 9.72% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the .05, .025, .01 levels, respectively. Variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  
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Figure 1: Shifter and Non-Shifter’s Comparability 
 
Figure 1: I created the graph to compare the comparability between shifter and non-shifter firms. The 
graph indicates that shifter firms’ comparability is less than those of non-shifter firms. 
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IV. ESSAY 3: BIG4, NON-BIG4 AUDITORS AND COMPARABILITY 
IV.1. Motivation 
The benefits to auditors of developing a comparable client base, and the benefits to 
clients of having comparable peers, have been the subject recent research (e.g., Zhang 
2018; Cairney and Stewart 2015). When compared to other variables affecting audit fees, 
client comparability has received little attention. Using the financial statement 
comparability measure developed by De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011), Zhang (2018) 
shows that auditors charge lower audit fees for auditing highly comparable firms. Using 
partial correlation (homogeneity) of client operating expense, Cariney and Stewart (2015) 
find that audit fees are negatively associated with homogeneity. These findings are intuitive 
in the sense that auditors pursue a lower average cost per client by applying the learned 
and developed audit processes from one client to other, comparable clients. Indeed, the 
fundamental assumption of audit firm specialization is that auditors can transfer the 
designed audit processes and knowledge gathered by auditing similar clients. This, in turn, 
suggests that maintaining a client base of comparable firms yields economic benefits.  
While most of the audit market research (e.g., Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and 
Walker 2004; Hay, Knechel, and Wogn 2006) presents evidence of higher audit fees for 
industry specialist auditors, Bills, Jeter, and Stein (2015) find that industry specialists 
charge incrementally lower audit fees in industries with homogenous operations. No study 
has yet investigated, however, whether Big4 and non-Big4 auditors respond to client 
comparability in the same way. The Big4 auditors are associated with higher quality of 
audit (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009; Choi, Kim, Kim, Zang 2010), suggesting higher audit 
fees. They also achieve economies of scale by auditing more comparable clients, 
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suggesting lower audit fees. Conversely, non-Big4 auditors are perceived to be associated 
with lower quality of audit, which should lead to lower audit fees. They also audit fewer, 
or less comparable clients, which should lead to higher audit fees. This is because when 
non-Big4 auditors audit less comparable clients, they they are unable to transfer the same 
audit processes and acquired knowledge to other clients. In turn, this would lead to fewer 
economies of scale and higher audit fees.   
Previous studies (Eichenseher and Danos 1981; Danos and Eichenseher 1982; 
Hogan and Jeter 1999; Cairney and Young 2006) document that auditors are more likely 
to be concentrated in regulated industries and to be specialists in homogenous industries. 
Auditors can transfer their learned knowledge to other similar clients in regulated and 
homogenous industries. This study, however, differs from previous studies in several ways. 
First, previous studies define industry homogeneity based on regulation and operating 
expense correlation. I use financial statement comparability, which is a robust measure and 
is recognized by researchers (e.g., De Franco et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2016; Imhof et al. 
2017; Chen et al. 2018; Zhang 2018). Second, previous studies investigate whether auditors 
specialize in homogenous industries. I examine whether non-Big4 auditors, mostly ignored 
in the audit literature, audit less comparable firms and charge higher audit fees (as 
conjectured above). Third, the proxies used for industry specialist in previous studies have 
limitations. Audousset-Coulier, Jeny, and Jiang (2015) document that the empirical results 
regarding specialization exhibit inconsistencies and uncertainties. The Big4 and non-Big4 
specification does suffer from such limitations.  
Using the financial statement comparability measure developed by De Franco et al. 
(2011), I find that comparability and non-Big4 auditors are negatively associated, 
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suggesting that client firms audited by non-Big4 auditors are less comparable than clients 
audited by Big4 auditors. The results hold after controlling for firm specific characteristics, 
endogeneity, and for alternative measures of comparability. I also find that non-Big4 
auditors charge incrementally higher audit fees for comparable firms, whereas Big4 
auditors charge lower audit fees. These findings are consistent with prior audit fee studies 
(Bills et al. 2015; Zhang 2018) and suggest that Big4 auditors have achieved economies of 
scale that non-Big4 have not.  
This study contributes to the auditing literature in several ways. First, prior studies 
(e.g., Zhang 2018) document that auditors charge lower audit fees for comparable firms; 
however, there is no evidence whether non-Big4 and Big4 auditors follow the same pattern 
in charging audit fees. This study fills this gap by investigating the association between 
comparability and non-Big4 auditors and documenting whether or not the conclusions of 
Zhang (2018) can be applied to non-Big4 auditors. Second, the existing audit fee literature 
is dominated by Big4 auditors. My study extends the understanding of audit fees by 
investigating whether non-Big4 auditors charge lower or higher fees to comparable firms. 
Third, the study contributes to the literature on mandatory rotation by showing Big4 
auditors are able to achieve economies of scale by auditing comparable firms, and that this 
translates into lower incremental audit fees. Fourth, I contribute to the literature on 
financial statement comparability and audit effort. Zhang (2018) investigates the impact of 
comparability on audit fees and finds that comparability and audit fees are negatively 
associated. I find that this only holds for Big4 auditors. Finally, this study responds to the 
call of Schipper (2003) who asks for more research on accounting comparability.  
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The structure of the study is as follows: Section 2 discusses prior literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design and describes the sample 
selection process. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
IV.2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Studies into whether CPA firms concentrate in industries began with Zeff and 
Fossum (1967), who present a narrative regarding the sales, assets, and (net) income 
numbers of The Fortune Directory, rearranged based on the CPA firms’ opinions. Zeff and 
Fossum (1967) document that Big8 auditors audit companies having 95.5 percent of total 
sales and 92.7 percent of the 639 companies they examine. Rhode et al. (1974) confirm 
that Big8 auditors audit more than 90 percent of companies whereas non-Big8 auditors 
audit about 7 percent of companies with a market share of 3.55 percent. Hogan and Jeter 
(1999) investigate industry specialization and market share during the 1976 to 1993 period, 
and find that auditor concentration is: higher in regulated industries and industries with 
higher growth, but lower in industries with a high risk of litigation. They also find that 
market leader auditors’ market share increased over the period.  
Studies (e.g., Craswell, Francis, Taylor 1995; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Dunn, 
Mayhew, Morsfield 2004) document that specialist auditors are associated with higher 
audit quality and higher audit fees. Other studies (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Hay and 
Jeter 2011; Palmrose 1986; Ferguson and Stokes 2002) report, however, that auditor 
industry specialization leads to audit fee discounts and does not have significant association 
with audit fees. Auditors develop specialization in unique industries (e.g., healthcare) so 
that they can earn fee premiums (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). Auditors not only 
113 
 
concentrate on fee-based but also on the cost side because having specialized knowledge 
on an industry will also help curb costs as auditors can easily transfer their learned 
knowledge to other clients in the same industry (Cullinan 1998). In an experimental study 
(Low 2004) reports that the knowledge and information gathered by specialist auditors 
during the audit of clients can be transferred to clients in the same industry but not 
necessarily to clients in other industries. Auditing similar clients also enhances auditor 
efficiency. When auditors become efficient, the can complete an audit with less time and 
effort, which should result in audit fees discounts. Recent studies (Cariney and Young 
2006; Bills et al. 2015; Stewart et al. 2015) find that auditors are more likely to specialize 
in industries having higher operating expense correlation among members of industries. 
The evidence of audit fees is also mixed in the homogeneity literature. Bills et al. (2015) 
and Stewart et al. (2015), for example, document that industry homogeneity and audit fees 
are negatively associated. In contrast, Cahan et al. (2008) report a positive association 
between audit fees and homogeneity.  
Using discretionary accruals, ex ante cost of equity capital, and analyst forecasts as 
proxies for audit quality, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), find that the effect 
of Big4 auditors are no different from those of non-Big4 auditors. Law (2008) finds that 
Big4 and non-Big4 auditors are not significantly different in their perceptions regarding 
the influence of non-audit services and competition on independence. Khurana and Raman 
(2004) find, however, that Big4 auditors are associated with a lower ex ante cost of equity 
capital, and report that litigation exposure rather than brand name reputation drives 
perceived audit quality. Louis (2005) explores the effect of auditor choice on acquirer 
firms’ market values around merger announcements. Louis finds that acquirers audited by 
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non-Big4 auditors outperform those audited by Big4 auditors. This suggests that smaller 
firms have a comparative advantage in assisting their clients’ merger transactions.   
The structure of the market for public accounting services has received scrutiny 
from regulators, practitioners, and researchers. Supplier size (the audit firm size) has 
become of subject of many studies (e.g., Simunic 1980; Francis 1984; Palmrose 1986; 
Niemi 2004). These studies find that Big N auditors charge higher than warranted audit 
fees. If Big8 auditors enjoy economies of scale, Simunic (1980) finds that they charge 
lower audit fees than the non-Big8. He also finds, however, that one of the Big8 auditors 
charges higher audit fees because of higher audit quality. Francis (1984) conducts his study 
on Australian data and reports that Big8 accounting firms have significantly higher audit 
fees than non-Big8 firms. This result holds for both large and small clients. Francis and 
Simon (1987) report that Big8 auditors charge premium audit fees and these results exist 
when compared to both second-tier national firms and local/regional firms. Using data on 
hourly billing rates and the auditor characteristics from 103 small Finnish audit firms, 
Neimi (2007) documents a positive association between auditor size and audit pricing.  
Recent studies (e.g., Bills et al. 2015; Zhang 2018) find that auditors charge lower 
audit fees for comparable clients. Zhang (2018), for example, finds that audit effort is 
negatively associated with financial statement comparability, suggesting that auditors 
enjoy economies of scale. Because auditors’ cost per unit of audit is less for comparable 
firms, they charge lower audit fees. Bills et al. (2015) find that specialist auditors charge 
incrementally lower audit fees for homogenous clients. Since most companies (almost 
80%) are audited by Big4 auditors, the overall findings are likely driven by the impact of 
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Big4 auditors. No study has yet investigated whether non-Big4 auditors follow a similar 
pattern when auditing comparable clients. 
Because Big4 auditors audit such a large percentage of companies, it is likely they 
have more comparable clients. If follows, that if their audits are more efficient, they can 
charge lower audit fees for comparable firms. On the other hand, client companies audited 
by non-Big4 auditors are more likely to be less comparable; therefore, they are thus less 
likely to be able to transfer learned knowledge and audit processes to other clients. 
Consequently, they are more likely to charge higher audit fees for comparable clients. This 
leads to my first and second hypotheses: 
Ha: Clients audited by Big4 auditors are more comparable than clients audited by  
      non-Big4 auditors.  
Hb: Non-Big4 auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees to comparable  
                  firms than do Big4 firms. 
IV.3. Research Design  
Sample Selection 
My sample selection procedure begins with all firms listed in the annual COMPUSTAT 
industrial file from 2000 through 201520. I merge CRSP with COMPUSTAT and drop utilities 
(SIC codes: 4000 to 4999) and financial firms (SIC codes: 6000 to 6999). After calculating 
the comparability score, I merged the comparability measure with AUDITANALYTICS 
data. I delete firm-year observations that have missing data for financial statement 
comparability, audit fees, and missing control variables. To deal with outliers, I winsorize 
all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. My final sample comprises 
26,373 firm-year observations.  
                                                          
20 My sample year starts from 2000 because Audit Analytics data are available from 2000.  
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Model Specification 
Following prior studies (e.g., Cairney and Young 2006), I use the following model 
to test my hypotheses: 
(ProbBig4=1)=β
0
+β
1
COMP4t+ ∑ βj
15
j=2
CONTROLSt+Indi+Yrt+εit                        (1) 
where Big4 is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor is one of the Bi4 
auditors. Following prior studies (e.g., Hogan and Jeter 1999; Cairney and Young 2006), I 
include LITIGATION, REG, GROWTH, CR4, and LNOX as control variables. 
LITIGATION is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the industry is one with high 
litigation risk.21 I include this because audit firms are less likely to audit firms in the 
litigious industries. Studies (e.g., Hogan and Jeter 1999; Eichenseher and Danos 1981) find 
that audit firms enjoy economies of scale if they audit firms in regulated industries. I 
include REG, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a regulated 
industry22. The third control variable is GROWTH, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the industry is in the top third of the industries’ growth measures, and 0 otherwise. 
GROWTH is calculated as the difference between sales in year t and t-1, divided by sales 
in t-1. I also control for four-firm industry concentration, CR4, which is the proportion of 
assets owned by the four largest firms in each industry k in year t. I calculate the ratio as 
the square root each firm’s asset divided by the sum of the square roots of all firms’ assets 
                                                          
21 Following prior studies (e.g., Bohn and Choi 1996; O’Brien 1997; Hogan and Jeter 1999; Cairney and 
Young 2006), I include firms in the list of relatively high litigation risk industries if the two-digit SIC codes 
are in any one of 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, 67, or 73.  
 
22 Following prior studies (e.g., Weis and Klass 1986; Hogan and Jeter 1999), I classify the following two-
digit SIC codes as regulated industries 10, 12, 14, 20, 29, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 67.   
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in the same industry for each year. I control for LNOX (log of the number of industry 
members) because auditors are less likely to audit firms in an industry that has fewer 
members. I also control for firm SIZE (log of total assets), audit fees (log of audit fees, 
LAF), and auditor change (AUDCH) because these variables affect whether auditors are 
more likely to be Big4 or not. I have also controlled for internal control effectiveness 
(INEFFIC), RESTATEMENTs, non-audit fees ratio (NAFRATIO), and return on assets 
(ROA) because these variables can also affect whether the auditor is among the Big4 
(Francis and Yu 2009; Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2010; Francis, Michas, and Yu 2013). 
Measuring Comparability 
I follow the De Franco et al. (2011) measure of financial statement comparability, 
which is based on the earnings-returns relationship of paired firms. De Franco et al. (2011) 
develop an empirical model based on the assumption that for a given set of economic 
events, two firms should produce similar financial statements. Following De Franco et al. 
(2011), I first estimate the following equation and use the previous 16 quarters of earnings 
(the proxy for financial statements) and returns (the proxy for economic-event data).  
Earnings
it
=αi+βiReturnit+εit                                                                             (2) 
where Earnings is the quarterly net income before extraordinary items (IBQ) scaled by 
beginning of the period market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO), and Return is the 
respective quarter’s stock price. I calculate ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 for firm i and in the same way I 
estimate α̂j and  β̂j for firm j. I then use these parameters to estimate expected earnings of 
firm i and j. I use the Return of firm i and the parameters of i and j to compare the Earnings 
of firm i and j as follows: 
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E(Earnings)
iit
=α̂i+β̂iReturnit                                                                                    (3) 
E(Earnings)
ijt
=α̂j+β̂jReturnit                                                                                    (4) 
Keeping the economic event, Returnit, constant, I calculate predicted earnings of 
firm 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 for the period t. I then compute accounting comparability between firm 𝑖 and j 
(COMP4ijt) from the following equation: 
COMPijt=-
1
16
* ∑|E(Earnings
iit
)-E(Earnings
ijt
)|
t
t-15
                                                     (5) 
 The less the difference between the predicted earnings of 𝑖 and j, the more 
comparable two firms’ accounting systems are. I estimate comparability for each 
firm i-firm j combination for J firms within the same two-digit SIC industry classification. 
Then I rank all J values of COMPijt for each firm 𝑖 from the highest to lowest. I then 
calculate COMP4it as the average of the highest four comparability scores of 
firm i with firm j. I also compute alternative measures of comparability: COMP10, 
COMPINMDN, and COMPINDMEAN. The detailed calculations of these measures are 
presented in Appendix A. 
IV.4. Empirical Results 
Summary Statistics 
In Table 1, I report the industry profile for my sample. After deleting industries 
with less than 10 observations (SIC 2100-2199, 5800-7213, 4950-4991), banking (6000-
6099), insurance (6300-6411), real estate (6500-6611), and financial trading (6200-6799), 
my sample covers 40 industries out of the Fama and French 48. The business services 
industry represents 15.46 percent of the sample and the pharmaceutical industry represents 
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10.43 percent. Most of the industries account for less than 5 percent. The industry profile 
data suggest that my sample is widely distributed. Table 2 presents the number of 
companies audited by the Big4 and non-Big4. Big4 auditors audit most of the companies 
(75.44 percent) with PwC auditing the greatest number (24.03 percent of the entire sample 
firms). Non-big4 auditors audit only 24.56 percent of the firms. Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main empirical model. The mean (median) 
of the comparability score is -0.56 (-0.30), which is consistent with recent studies (e.g., 
Imholf et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2018). The means and median of all 
control variables are consistent with those presented by Cairney and Young (2006).  
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. The matrix shows that Big4 and 
financial statement comparability are significantly, negatively correlated but the 
correlation coefficient is only 0.13 (p-value < 0.000). The correlation between non-Big4 
and comparability is just the opposite. The correlation coefficient suggests that Big4 
auditors are more likely to audit comparable firms and non-Big4 auditors are less likely to 
audit comparable firms. Three of my control variables have correlation coefficients more 
than 0.50, however, the variance inflation factor (VIF) of ordinary least squares (OLS) for 
any control variable is less than 10 and the mean VIF of the entire sample is 1.80, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious concern23.  
Multivariate results 
Table 5 reports the main results of my tests. The results provide evidence 
supporting my hypothesis that financial statement comparability is less associated with 
                                                          
23 Studies in econometrics (e.g., Carlsson and Lundström 2002; O’brien 2007) suggest that VIF less than 
10, 20, and 30 indicate that there is not a problem with multicollinearity.  
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non-Big4 auditors, and more associated with Big4 auditors. In the first column, the 
coefficient of COMP4 is positive and significant (β
1
= 0.09, t-value = 5.22), suggesting that 
companies audited by Big4 auditors are more comparable than the companies audited by 
non-Big4 auditors. The negative coefficient on COMP4 in column (2) supports the 
hypothesis that companies audited by non-Big4 auditors are less comparable.  
Controlling for Potential Endogeneity Problems 
The relation between financial statement comparability and Big4 and Non-Big4 
auditor may be biased because of endogeneity related to omitted variables and reverse 
causality. For example, the financial statements are more comparable because they are 
audited by Big4 auditors and less comparable because they are audited by non-Big4 
auditors. To address the endogeneity issue, I use a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) approach 
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Gassell et al. 2012; 
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb 2012; Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2013). In the first stage, 
I regress COMP4 on various instrumental variables (IV) and other variables explaining 
accounting comparability, and then the predicted value of COMP4 is used for the main 
regressions in the second stage. Econometric theories on 2SLS state that we need at least 
one exogenous (instrumental) variable for estimating the endogenous variable. In my case, 
the ideal instruments should correlate with financial statement comparability but not with 
Big4 auditors or Non-Big4 auditors. I identify four IVs that are more likely to be correlated 
with financial statement comparability and yet unlikely to be associated with auditor type. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Brown and Kimbrough 2011; Sohn 2016), I use labor 
intensity (LABORINT), capital intensity (CAPINT), the book to market ratio (BM), and 
post 2005 (POST2005) as instrumental variables because financial statement comparability 
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may vary across these business characteristics. I perform several post estimations of 
endogeneity.24 The 2SLS models are specified as follows: 
First stage: 
COMP4=β
0
+β
1
LABORINTt-1+β2CAPINTt-1+β3BMt-1+β3POST2005t-1 
+ ∑ β
j
CONTROLSt+Indi+Yt+εit      (5) 
Second stage: 
PROB_BIG4/NON-BIG4=β
0
++β
1
Predicted(OPSIM) 
+ ∑ β
j
CONTROLSt+Indi+Yt+εit                                   (6) 
Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), I include the same set of control variables 
from the second stage model in the first stage model plus industry and year fixed effects. 
The results of both the first-stage and second stage regression are reported in the Table 6. 
The column (1) reports the results of Eq. (5), which show that my instruments are 
associated with the endogenous variable, COMP4. The coefficients of LABORINT, 
CAPINT, BM, and POST2005 are significant. This suggests that my instruments are 
associated with COMP4. Column (2) presents the results of Eq. (6), which shows the 
impact of the predicted value of COMP4 on Big4 or Non-Big4. Column (2) of Table 6 
reports the results of the association between Big4 auditors and financial statement 
comparability. The coefficient on Predicted(COMP4) is positive (t-value=5.73) and 
significant at 1% level (t-value =5.73), suggesting that firms audited by Big4 auditors are 
                                                          
24 I test whether the instruments are weak. The partial R2 of 0.201, which is the correlation between my 
instruments and the endogenous variables, rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. The F-
statistic (F= 1544.88) is also greater than all the critical values of 2SLS Wald tests. This suggests that my 
instruments are not weak. I also test for over-identification of my instruments and find that the Sargan Chi-
Square and Basmann Chi-Square are insignificant (p=0.3200), accepting the null hypothesis that my 
instruments are not over-identified.  
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comparable. Column (3) presents the results of the relation between Non-Big4 auditors and 
comparability, and the coefficient on Predicted(COMP4) is negative (-0.541) and 
significant at 1% level (t-value = 5.73), suggesting that clients audited by Non-big4 
auditors are less comparable.  
Alternative measures of comparability 
My main regression analysis is based on the most commonly used financial 
statement comparability measure (COMP4). To control for industry effects and as a 
robustness check, I employ three additional measures of comparability: (1) COMP10, 
computed as the average of top-10 firms’ COMP scores (De Franco et al. 2011 p.901); (2) 
COMP_INDMEAN, which is the average FSCOMP of all firm i's FSCOMP scores in the 
same two-digit SIC industry; and (3) COMP_INDMDN, which is the median FSCOMP 
scores for all firms j in the same two-digit SIC industry as firm i. The results for these 
alternative measures are reported in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 7. The coefficients 
of all comparability measures are significantly negative, indicating that financial statement 
comparability is negatively associated with trade credit. In summary, the results from the 
main regression presented in Table 3 are robust to these alternative measures of 
comparability.  
Big4, non-Big4, and Audit Fees 
Prior studies (e.g., Zhang 2018; Cairney and Stewart 2015; Bills et al. 2015) find 
that auditors charge lower audit fees for comparable clients. Even though their findings 
may be driven by the impact of Big4 firms, they do not show whether non-Big4 auditors 
follow a similar pattern. Table 8 presents the results of my tests. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient on BIG4×COMP4 is negative (β
1
=-0.031) and significant (t-value = -2.54). 
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This suggests that Big4 auditors charge lower audit fees when client firms are comparable. 
In column (2), the coefficient on NON-BIG4×COMP4 is positive (β
1
=-0.031) and 
significant (t-value = 2.54). In contrast, this suggests that non-Big4 auditors charge higher 
audit fees to comparable clients. These higher audit fees can be explained based on audit 
effort. Since non-big4 auditors audit fewer and less comparable clients, they are likely not 
able to enjoy the economies of scale possessed by the Big4.  
IV.5. Summary 
While previous studies document an association between comparability and audit 
fees, questions about the comparability of companies audited by Big4 and non-Big4 
auditors have not previously been answered. My study provides evidence that companies 
audited by Big4 auditors are more comparable than companies audited by the non-Big4. I 
further find that Big4 auditors charge lower audit fees for comparable firms whereas non-
Big4 auditors charge incrementally higher audit fees. My conjecture is that Big4 auditors 
can transfer their learned skills and same audit processes to many clients, but non-Big4 
auditors are less likely to have this advantage. My findings are robust after controlling for 
firm characteristics and potential endogeneity. The findings are also robust to using 
alternative measures of comparability.  
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Appendix A: Variable definition 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
COMP4 Financial statement comparability score (FSC) computed as in De 
Franco et al. (2011).  
COMPINDMEAN The average FSC of all firm 𝑖′𝑠 comparability scores in the same 
two-digit SIC industry during year t.  
COMPINMDN The median FSC for all firms j in the same two-digit SIC industry 
as firm 𝑖 during period t.  
COMP10 The average FSC of the top-10 firms.  
CR4 The proportion of assets owned by the four largest firms in each 
industry k in year t. 
LNOX Log of the number of industry members. 
LITIGATION A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is among those with 
high litigation risk and 0 otherwise: SIC codes 28, 35, 36, 38, 60, 
67, 73.  
REGUL An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a regulated 
industry, and 0 otherwise: SIC codes 10, 12, 14, 20, 29, 40, 41, 42, 
45, 46, 48, 49, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67 
GROWTH A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is in the top third of 
industrial growth, and 0 otherwise. GROWTH is calculated as the 
difference between sales in year t and t-1 divided by sales of t-1. 
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ROA Return on Assets, calculated 
as net income divided by beginning total assets. 
G1 
G2 
G3 
G4 
Four indicator variables based on the revised version of the 
governance index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). Smaller 
values mean shareholders have greater rights. The G1 equals 1 if the 
governance index is less than or equal to 6, and 0 otherwise. The G2 
equals 1 if the index is more than 6 and less than or equal to 9, and 
0 otherwise. The G3 equals 1 if the index is more than 9 and less 
than or equal to 12, and 0 otherwise. The G4 equals 1 if the index is 
more than 13, and 0 otherwise. As in Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) and Jha and Chen (2015) when the G-index is not available, 
it is replaced with the previous year’s value. 
SIZE Size of firm, computed as log of total assets (AT) 
CRISIS Equal to 1 if the fiscal year is 2008, 0 otherwise. 
SOX Equal to 1 if fiscal year is after 2002, otherwise. 
BIG4 Equal to 1 if auditor is one of the big4 auditors, 0 otherwise. 
NON-BIG4 Equal to 1 if auditor is not one of the Big4 auditors, 0 otherwise. 
GC Equal to 1 if the auditor issues a going concern opinion, 0 
otherwise. 
AUDC Equal to 1 if there is an auditor change, 0 otherwise. 
UNQUALOP This indicator variable equals 1 if the auditor issues an unqualified 
opinion without any additional language (Compustat data item 
AUOP=1), 0 otherwise. 
QUICK Ratio of (current assets-inventory) to current liabilities. 
SQRTSEGMENT Square root of (the number of geographic segments+1). 
INVREC Sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets. 
LOGTIME Time lag between the signature date of the audit opinion and fiscal 
year-end. 
FORGN Equal to 1 if the firm reports foreign sales, 0 otherwise. 
NAFRATIO Ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees. 
INEFFIC Equal to 1 if internal control is ineffective, 0 otherwise.  
DIVSTATUS Equal to 1 if firm declared a dividend, 0 otherwise. 
SPECIALIST Equal to 1 if the auditor is an industry specialist, 0 otherwise. 
RESTATEMENT Equal to 1 if the firm reports a restatement in a fiscal year, 0 
otherwise. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt (DLTT) to total assets. 
LAF Log of audit fees. 
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Table 1 
Number of sample firms by industrya  
FF48 n % Cum % FF48 n % Cum% 
1 12 0.05 0.05 22 605 2.29 41.97 
2 470 1.78 1.83 23 457 1.73 43.7 
3 64 0.24 2.07 24 214 0.81 44.52 
4 133 0.5 2.57 25 75 0.28 44.8 
6 283 1.07 3.65 26 83 0.31 45.11 
7 334 1.27 4.91 27 73 0.28 45.39 
8 198 0.75 5.66 28 90 0.34 45.73 
9 474 1.8 7.46 29 10 0.03 45.77 
10 290 1.1 8.56 30 1,543 5.85 51.62 
11 669 2.54 11.1 32 863 3.27 54.89 
12 1,351 5.12 16.22 33 69 0.26 55.15 
13 2,750 10.43 26.65 34 4,078 15.46 70.61 
14 675 2.56 29.21 35 1,352 5.13 75.74 
15 244 0.93 30.13 36 2,300 8.72 84.46 
16 27 0.1 30.24 37 873 3.31 87.77 
17 588 2.23 32.47 38 440 1.67 89.44 
18 167 0.63 33.1 39 66 0.25 89.69 
19 411 1.56 34.66 40 523 1.98 91.67 
20 72 0.27 34.93 41 1,080 4.1 95.77 
21 1,252 4.75 39.68 42 553 2.1 97.87 
Total 26,373 100 100 
 
aFama-French (1997) industry classifications. 
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Table 2 
 Number of firms by auditor type: Big4 vs Non-Big4a 
 
Auditor_Key n % Cum% 
D&T 5,434 20.37 20.37 
PWC 6,410 24.03 44.39 
EY 3,934 14.75 59.14 
KPMG 4,345 16.29 75.43 
Big4 total 20,123 75.44 75.44 
Non-Big4 6,250 24.56 100.00 
Total  26,373 100  
 
a Big4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Deloitte, PwC, EY, or KPMG, and otherwise zero. 
Non-Big4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is not Deloitte, PwC, EY, or KPMG, and otherwise 
zero. 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statisticsa 
 
 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
Big4 26,373 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Non-Big4 26,373 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
COMP4 26,373 -0.56 0.59 -1.90 -0.75 -0.30 -0.13 -0.07 
CR4 26,373 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LITIGATION 26,373 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
REGU 26,373 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LNOX 26,373 7.03 0.96 2.20 6.33 7.21 7.92 8.31 
SIZE 26,373 5.94 2.06 0.50 4.4 5.85 7.34 12.76 
INEFFIC 26,373 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
RESTATEMENT 26,373 0.13 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NAFRATIO 26,373 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.49 64.44 
ROA 26,373 -0.05 0.36 -17.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.43 
AUDCH 26,373 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LAF 26,373 13.39 1.32 9.21 12.39 13.36 14.28 16.85 
 
aAll continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A 
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Table 4 - Correlation Matrix  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Big4 1.00               
2 Non-Big4 -1.00 1.00              
3 COMP4 0.13 -0.13 1.00             
4 CR4 -0.20 0.20 -0.04 1.00            
5 LITIGATION 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.23 1.00           
6 REGU 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.23 1.00          
7 LNOX -0.01 0.01 0.15 0.51 0.49 -0.26 1.00         
8 SIZE 0.44 -0.44 0.22 -0.55 -0.18 0.16 -0.16 1.00        
9 INEFFIC -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.04 1.00       
10 RESTATEMENT 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 1.00      
11 SPECIALIST 0.28 -0.28 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.20 -0.02 0.01 1.00     
12 NAFRATIO 0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.04 1.00    
13 ROA 0.08 -0.08 0.22 -0.15 -0.18 0.05 -0.15 0.34 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 1.00   
14 AUDCH -0.12 0.12 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 1.00  
15 LAF 0.43 -0.43 0.17 -0.46 -0.09 0.07 -0.07 0.84 0.07 -0.03 0.19 -0.07 0.20 -0.13 1.00 
 
132 
 
Table 5 
Financial Statement Comparability: Big4 and Non-Big4 auditorsa 
 Dependent variable = Big4  Dependent variable = Non-Big4 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
COMP4        0.091*** 5.22           -0.091*** -5.22 
CR4        0.338** 2.13            -0.016 -0.40 
LITIGATION        0.065 0.39            -0.213*** -8.89 
REGU        0.002 0.01             0.007 0.19 
LNOX       -0.262 -0.81            -0.017 -1.17 
SIZE        0.302*** 6.24            -0.243*** -22.44 
INEFFIC       -0.827*** -8.27             0.480*** 10.15 
RESTATEMENT        0.046 0.73            -0.245*** -7.99 
NAFRATIO       -0.073** -1.96            -0.014 -1.42 
ROA       -0.340*** -3.58             0.288*** 9.90 
AUDCH       -0.778*** -11.30             0.281*** 8.15 
LAF        1.211*** 15.82            -0.301*** -19.96 
Constant     -16.600***      -6.27             4.883*** 27.83 
Year FE Yes   Yes  
Industry FE Yes   Yes  
Pseudo R2  0.3268   0.2949  
n 26,373   26,373  
 
aThis table presents the regression results for the base regression (Eq. 1). Column 1 presents the association 
between client firm comparability and Big4 auditor. Column 2 presents the association between Non-Big4 
auditor and financial statement comparability. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.   
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Table 6 
 
Results of First and Second Stage Regressions of 2SLSa  
 
 First Stage  Second Stage 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Dependent variable COMP4  Big4  Non-Big4 
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
LABORINT 2.676** 2.48     
CAPINT -0.323*** -15.69       
BM -0.262*** -25.62       
POST2005 0.016** 2.13       
Predicted(COMP4)    0.541*** 5.73  -0.541*** -5.73 
CR4  0.002 0.14   0.033 0.82  -0.033 -0.82 
LITIGATION 0.042*** 5.20  0.172*** 6.87  -0.172*** -6.87 
REGUL -0.098*** -7.63   0.035 0.83  -0.035 -0.83 
LNOX 0.088*** 17.99  -0.032* -1.82   0.032* 1.82 
SIZE 0.090*** 22.64  0.217*** 17.46  -0.217*** -17.46 
INEFFIC  0.002 0.12  -0.451*** -9.43  0.451*** 9.43 
RESTATEMENT -0.004 -0.38  0.248*** 8.06  -0.248*** -8.06 
SPECIALIST  0.002 0.26  1.420*** 33.96  -1.420*** -33.96 
NAFRATIO  0.005 1.24   0.008 0.83  -0.008 -0.83 
ROA 0.317*** 31.68  -0.425*** -10.50  0.425*** 10.50 
AUDCH -0.090*** -6.98  -0.237*** -6.63  0.237*** 6.63 
LAF -0.068*** -11.80  0.309*** 20.13  -0.309*** -20.13 
CONSTANT -0.604*** -9.17  -4.258*** -19.68  4.258*** 19.68 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry FE Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.154        
Pseudo R2    0.294   0.294  
n 26,468   26,468   26,468  
 
aColumn 1 presents the first-stage results for financial statement comparability (Eq. 5). Labor intensity 
(LABORINT), capital intensity (CAPINT), book to market ratio (BM), and post 2005 (POST2005) are 
instrumental variables. Columns 2 (BIG4) and 3 (NON-BIG4) report results from the second stage regressions 
(where COMP4 is replaced by the predicted value of COMP4 from the first stage regression). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Alternative Measures of Comparability: Big4 and Non-Big4a 
 
Dependent variable = Big4 Auditor 
COMPINDMEAN COMPINMDN COMP10 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
COMP  0.021*** 3.16  0.034*** 4.14  0.058*** 4.23 
CR4  0.276*** 5.89  0.275*** 5.88  0.279*** 5.96 
LITIGATION  0.060 1.56  0.060 1.56  0.049 1.26 
REGUL -0.003 -0.03  0.006 0.05  0.004 0.03 
LNOX -0.226** -1.96 -0.229** -1.98 -0.218* -1.90 
SIZE  0.176*** 13.24  0.175*** 13.27  0.175*** 13.26 
INEFFIC -0.445*** -8.68 -0.445*** -8.68 -0.444*** -8.66 
RESTATEMENT  0.025 0.73  0.025 0.74  0.026 0.77 
SPECIALIST  1.365*** 31.80  1.367*** 31.80  1.364*** 31.77 
NAFRATIO -0.061*** -4.86 -0.061*** -4.86 -0.061*** -4.87 
ROA -0.177*** -5.46 -0.180*** -5.62 -0.175*** -5.52 
AUDCH -0.450*** -11.93 -0.449*** -11.89 -0.449*** -11.88 
LAF  0.616*** 30.34  0.616*** 30.41  0.617*** 30.43 
Constant -8.108 -8.65 -8.049*** -8.57 -8.131*** -8.70 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R2 0.369  0.369  0.369  
n 26,363  
26,363  26,363  
 
aAll continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 7 (Continued)  
Alternative Measures of Comparability: Big4 and Non-Big4a 
 Dependent variable = Non-Big4 Auditor 
COMPINDMEAN COMPINMDN COMP10 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
COMP -0.021*** -3.16 -0.034*** -4.14 -0.058*** -4.23 
CR4 -0.276*** -5.89 -0.275*** -5.88 -0.279*** -5.96 
LITIGATION -0.060 -1.56 -0.060 -1.56 -0.049 -1.26 
REGUL  0.003 0.03 -0.006 -0.05 -0.004 -0.03 
LNOX  0.226** 1.96  0.229** 1.98  0.218* 1.90 
SIZE -0.176*** -13.24 -0.175*** -13.27 -0.175*** -13.26 
INEFFIC  0.445*** 8.68  0.445*** 8.68  0.444*** 8.66 
RESTATEMENT -0.025 -0.73 -0.025 -0.74 -0.026 -0.77 
SPECIALIST -1.365*** -31.80 -1.367*** -31.80 -1.364*** -31.77 
NAFRATIO  0.061*** 4.86  0.061*** 4.86  0.061*** 4.87 
ROA  0.177*** 5.46  0.180*** 5.62  0.175*** 5.52 
AUDCH  0.450*** 11.93  0.449*** 11.89  0.449*** 11.88 
LAF -0.616*** -30.34 -0.616*** -30.41 -0.617*** -30.43 
Constant  8.108*** 8.65  8.049*** 8.57  8.131*** 8.70 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R2 0.400  0.369  0.396  
n   26,363  26,363  
 
aAll continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
 
Audit fees, non-Big4 and Big4 Auditorsa 
 
 Dependent variable = Log of Audit Fees 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
BIG4×COMP4 -0.031** -2.54    
COMP4 -0.054*** -5.14  -0.085*** -11.88 
BIG4 0.253*** 21.83    
NON-BIG4×COMP4    0.031** 2.54 
NON-BIG4    -0.253*** -21.83 
SIZE 0.546*** 222.47  0.546*** 222.47 
ROA -0.262*** -23.22  -0.262*** -23.22 
CRISIS 0.061 1.06  0.061 1.06 
SOX 0.720*** 2.82  0.720*** 2.82 
BUSY 0.069*** 8.82  0.069*** 8.82 
GC 0.062*** 2.93  0.062*** 2.93 
AUDCH -0.114*** -9.33  -0.114*** -9.33 
UNQUALOP -0.083*** -10.26  -0.083*** -10.26 
QUICK -0.027*** -20.34  -0.027*** -20.34 
SQRTSEGMENT 0.026 1.22  0.026 1.22 
INVREC 0.361*** 15.09  0.361*** 15.09 
GROWTH 0.014*** 7.01  0.014*** 7.01 
LOGTIME 0.235*** 21.43  0.235*** 21.43 
FORGN 0.099*** 9.97  0.099*** 9.97 
NAFRATIO -0.104*** -21.69  -0.104*** -21.69 
INEFFIC 0.290*** 18.02  0.290*** 18.02 
DIVSTATUS 0.022*** 2.78  0.022*** 2.78 
SPECIALIST 0.048*** 6.06  0.048*** 6.06 
RESTATEMENT -0.037*** -3.79  -0.037*** -3.79 
LEV 0.049*** 4.12  0.049*** 4.12 
Constant 8.048*** 27.38  8.301*** 28.22 
Year FE Yes  
 Yes  
Industry FE Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.859   0.859  
Observation 25,458   25,458  
a This table presents the regression results whether Big4 and non-Big4 auditors charge higher or lower audit 
fees for comparable firms. Column (1) presents the association between audit fees and Big4 auditors and 
column (2) presents the association between non-Big4 auditors and audit fees. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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